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Abstract
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately-optimal auctions in the
context of the “FedEx” problem, a so-called “one-and-a-half-dimensional” setting where a
single bidder has both a value and a deadline for receiving an item [FGKK16]. The menu
complexity of an auction is equal to the number of distinct (allocation, price) pairs that a
bidder might receive [HN13]. We show the following when the bidder has n possible deadlines:
• Exponential menu complexity is necessary to be exactly optimal: There exist
instances where the optimal mechanism has menu complexity ≥ 2n − 1. This matches
exactly the upper bound provided by Fiat et al.’s algorithm, and resolves one of their open
questions [FGKK16].
• Fully polynomial menu complexity is necessary and sufficient for approxima-
tion: For all instances, there exists a mechanism guaranteeing a multiplicative (1 − )-
approximation to the optimal revenue with menu complexity O(n3/2
√
min{n/,ln(vmax)}
 ) =
O(n2/), where vmax denotes the largest value in the support of integral distributions.
• There exist instances where any mechanism guaranteeing a multiplicative (1−O(1/n2))-
approximation to the optimal revenue requires menu complexity Ω(n2).
Our main technique is the polygon approximation of concave functions [Rot92], and our
results here should be of independent interest. We further show how our techniques can be
used to resolve an open question of [DW17] on the menu complexity of optimal auctions for
a budget-constrained buyer.
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1 Introduction
It is by now quite well understood that optimal mechanisms are far from simple: they may
be randomized [Tha04, BCKW10, HN13], behave non-monotonically [HR15, RW15], and be
computationally hard to find [CDW13, DDT14, CDP+14, Rub16]. To cope with this, much
recent attention has shifted to the design of simple, but approximately optimal mechanisms
(e.g. [CHK07, CHMS10, HN12, BILW14]). However, the majority of these works take a binary
view on simplicity, developing simple mechanisms that guarantee constant-factor approximations.
Only recently have researchers started to explore the tradeoff space between simplicity and
optimality through the lens of menu complexity.
Hart and Nisan first proposed the menu complexity as one quantitative measure of simplicity,
which captures the number of different outcomes that a buyer might see when participating in a
mechanism [HN13]. For example, the mechanism that offers only the grand bundle of all items
at price p (or nothing at price 0) has menu complexity 1. The mechanism that offers any single
item at price p (or nothing at price 0) has menu complexity n, and randomized mechanisms
could have infinite menu complexity.
Still, all results to date regarding menu complexity have really been more qualitative than
quantitative. For example, only just now is the state-of-the-art able to show that for a single
additive bidder with independent values for multiple items and all ε > 0, the menu complexity
required for a (1− ε) approximation is finite [BGN17] (and even reaching this point was quite
non-trivial). On the quantitative side, the best known positive results for a single additive
or unit-demand bidder with independent item values require menu complexity exp(n) for a
(1− ε)-approximation, but the best known lower bounds have yet to rule out that poly(n) menu
complexity suffices for a (1− ε)-approximation in either case. In this context, our work provides
the first nearly-tight quantitative bounds on menu complexity in any multi-dimensional setting.
1.1 One-and-a-half dimensional mechanism design
The setting we consider is the so-called “FedEx Problem,” first studied in [FGKK16]. Here, there
is a single bidder with a value v for the item and a deadline i for receiving it, and the pair (v, i) is
drawn from an arbitrarily correlated distribution where the number of possible deadlines is finite
(n). The buyer’s value for receiving the item by her deadline is v, and her value for receiving
the item after her deadline (or not at all) is 0. While technically a two-dimensional problem,
optimal mechanisms for the FedEx problem don’t suffer the same undesirable properties as
“truly” two-dimensional problems. Still, the space of optimal mechanisms is considerably richer
than single-dimensional problems (hence the colloquial term “one-and-a-half dimensional”).
More specifically, while the optimal mechanism might be randomized, it has menu complexity at
most 2n − 1, and there is an inductive closed-form solution describing it. Additionally, there is a
natural condition on each Fi (the marginal distribution of v conditioned on i) guaranteeing that
the optimal mechanism is deterministic (and therefore has menu complexity ≤ n).1
A number of recent (and not-so-recent) works examine similar settings such as when the
buyer has a value and budget [LR96, CG00, CMM11, DW17], or a value and a capacity [DHP17],
and observe similar structure on the optimal mechanism. Such settings are quickly gaining
interest within the algorithmic mechanism design community as they are rich enough for optimal
mechanisms to be highly non-trivial, but not quite so chaotic as truly multi-dimensional settings.
1.2 Our results
We study the menu complexity of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms for the FedEx
problem. Our first result proves that the 2n − 1 upper bound on the menu complexity of the
1This condition is called “decreasing marginal revenues,” and is satisfied by distributions with CDF F and
PDF f such that x · f(x)− 1 + F (x) is monotone non-decreasing.
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optimal mechanism provided by Fiat et al.’s algorithm is exactly tight:
Theorem 1.1. For all n, there exist instances of the FedEx problem on n days where the menu
complexity of the optimal mechanism is 2n − 1.
From here, we turn to approximation and prove our main results. First, we show that fully
polynomial menu complexity suffices for a (1− ε)-approximation. The guarantee below is always
O(n2/ε), but is often improved for specific instances. Below, if the FedEx instance happens to
have integral support and the largest value is vmax, we can get an improved bound (but if the
support is continuous or otherwise non-integral, we can just take the n/ε term instead).2
Theorem 1.2. For all instances of the FedEx problem on n days, there exists a mechanism of
menu complexity O
(
n
√
min{n/ε,ln(vmax)}
ε/n
)
guaranteeing a (1− ε) approximation to the optimal
revenue.
In Theorem 1.2, observe that for any fixed instance, as ε→ 0, our bound grows like O(1/√ε)
(because eventually n/ε will exceed ln(vmax)). Similarly, our bound is always O(n
2/ε) for any
vmax. Both of these dependencies are provably tight for our approach (discussed shortly in
Section 1.3), and in general tight up to a factor of
√
n log n.3
Theorem 1.3. For all n, there exists an instance of the FedEx problem on n days with vmax =
O(n), such that the menu complexity of every (1−O(1/n2))-optimal mechanism is Ω(n2).
We consider Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 to be our main results, with Theorem 1.1 motivating the
study of approximation in the first place. Taken together, the picture provided by these results
is the following:
• Exactly optimal mechanisms can require exponential menu complexity (Theorem 1.1), while
(1−ε)-approximate mechanisms exist with fully polynomial menu complexity (Theorem 1.2).
• The menu complexity required to guarantee a (1−ε)-approximation is nailed down within a
multiplicative
√
n log n gap, and lies in
[
Ω
(√
n/ log n ·
√
min{n/ε,ln(vmax)}
ε/n
)
, O
(
n ·
√
min{n/ε,ln(vmax)}
ε/n
)]
(lower bound: Theorem 1.3, upper bound Theorem 1.2).
1.3 Our techniques
We’ll provide an intuitive proof overview for each result in the corresponding technical section,
but we briefly want to highlight one aspect of our approach that should be of independent
interest.
It turns out that the problem of revenue maximization with bounded menu complexity really
boils down to a question of how well piece-wise linear functions with bounded number of segments
can approximate concave functions (we won’t get into details of why this is the case until Section 4).
This is a quite well-studied problem called polygon approximation (e.g. [Rot92, YG97, BHR91]).
Questions asked here are typically of the form “for a concave function f and interval [0, vmax]
such that f ′(0) = 1, f ′(vmax) = 0, what is the minimum number of segments a piece-wise linear
function g must have to guarantee f(x) ≥ g(x) ≥ f(x)− ε for all x ∈ [0, vmax]?”
The answer to the above question is Θ(
√
vmax/ε) [Rot92, YG97]. This bound certainly
suffices for our purposes to get some bound on the menu complexity of (1 − ε)-approximate
auctions, but it would be much weaker than what Theorem 1.2 provides (we’d have linear instead
2Actually our bounds can be be improved to replace vmax with many other quantities that are always ≤ vmax,
and will still be well-defined for continuous distributions, more on this in Section 4.
3The gap of
√
n logn comes as our upper bound approach requires that we lose at most εOPT/n “per day,”
while our lower bound approach shows that any mechanism with lower menu complexity loses at least εOPT on
some day.
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of logarithmic dependence on vmax, and no option to remove vmax from the picture completely).
Interestingly though, for our application absolute additive error doesn’t tightly characterize
what we need (again, we won’t get into why this is the case until Section 4). Instead, we are
really looking for the following kind of guarantee, which is a bit of a hybrid between additive and
multiplicative: for a concave function f and interval [0, vmax] such that f
′(0) = 1, f ′(vmax) = 0,
what is the minimum number of segments a piece-wise linear function g must have to guarantee
f(x) ≥ g(x) ≥ f(x)− ε− ε(f(vmax)− f(0))?
At first glance it seems like this really shouldn’t change the problem at all: why don’t we
just redefine ε′ := ε(1 + f(vmax) − f(0)) and plug into upper bounds of Rote for ε′? This is
indeed completely valid, and we could again chase through and obtain some weaker version of
Theorem 1.2 that also references additional parameters in unintuitive ways. But it turns out
that for all examples in which this Ω(
√
vmax/ε) dependence is tight, there is actually quite a
large gap between f(0) and f(vmax), and a greatly improved bound is possible (which replaces
the linear dependence on vmax with logarithmic dependence, and provides an option to remove
vmax from the picture completely at the cost of worse dependence on ε).
Theorem 1.4. For any concave function f and any ε > 0 such that f ′(0) ≤ 1, f ′(vmax) ≥ 0,
there exists a piece-wise linear function g such that f(x) ≥ g(x) ≥ f(x)− ε(1 + f(vmax)− f(0))
with Θ(
√
ln(vmax)/ε) segments, and this is tight.
If one wishes to remove the dependence on vmax, then one can replace the bound with Θ(1/ε),
which is also tight (among bounds that don’t depend on vmax).
The proof of Theorem 1.4 is self-contained and appears in Section 4. Both the statement
of Theorem 1.4 and our proof will be useful for future work on menu complexity, and possibly
outside of mechanism design as well - to the best of our knowledge these kinds of hybrid
guarantees haven’t been previously considered.4
1.4 Related work
Menu complexity. Initial results on menu complexity prove that for a single additive or
unit-demand bidder with arbitrarily correlated item values over just 2 items, there exist instances
where the optimal (randomized, with infinite menu complexity) mechanism achieves infinite
revenue, while any mechanism of menu complexity C achieves revenue ≤ C (so no finite
approximation is possible with bounded menu complexity) [BCKW10, HN13]. This motivated
follow-up work subject to assumptions on the distributions, such as a generalized hazard rate
condition [WT14], or independence across item values [DDT13, BGN17]. Even for a single
bidder with independent values for two items, the optimal mechanism could have uncountable
menu complexity [DDT13], motivating the study of approximately optimal mechanisms subject
to these assumptions. Only just recently did we learn that the menu complexity is indeed finite
for this setting [BGN17].
It is also worth noting that other notions of simplicity have been previously considered
as well, such as the sample complexity (how many samples from a distribution are required
to learn an approximately optimal auction?). Here, quantitative bounds are known for the
single-item setting (where the menu complexity question is trivial: optimal mechanisms have
menu complexity 1) [CR14, HMR15, DHP16, GN17], but again only binary bounds are known
for the multi-item setting: few samples suffice for a constant-factor approximation if values are
independent [MR15, MR16], while exponentially many samples are required when values are
arbitrarily correlated [DHN14]. In comparison to works of the previous paragraphs, we are the
first to nail down “the right” quantitative menu complexity bounds in any multi-dimensional
setting.
4Interestingly (and completely unrelated to this work), hybrid additive-multiplicative approximations for core
problems in online learning have also found use in other recent directions in AGT [DJF16, SBN17].
3
One-and-a-half dimensional mechanism design. One-and-a-half dimensional settings
have been studied for decades by economists, the most notable example possibly being that
of a single buyer with a value and a budget [LR96, CG00]. Recently, such problems have
become popular within the AGT community as optimal auctions are more involved than single-
dimensional settings, but not quite so chaotic as truly multidimensional settings [FGKK16,
DW17, DHP17]. Each of these works focus exclusively on exactly optimal mechanisms (and
exclusively on positive results). In comparison, our work is both the first to prove lower bounds
on the complexity of (approximately) optimal mechanisms in these settings, and the first to
provide nearly-optimal mechanisms that are considerably less complex.
Polygon approximation. Prior work on polygon approximation is vast, and includes, for
instance, core results on univariate concave functions [Rot92, BHR91, YG97], the study of multi-
variate functions [Bro08, GG09, DDY16], and even applications in robotics [BGO07]. The more
recent work has mostly been pushing toward better guarantees for higher dimensional functions.
To the best of our knowledge, the kinds of guarantees we target via Theorem 1.4 haven’t been
previously considered, and could prove more useful than absolute additive guarantees for some
applications.
1.5 Organization
In Section 2, we formally describe the FedEx problem and recap the main result of [FGKK16].
In Section 3 we present an instance of the FedEx problem whose menu complexity for optimal
auctions is exponential, the worst possible. In Section 4 we present a mechanism that guarantees
a (1-ε) fraction of the optimal revenue with a menu complexity of O(n
2
ε ). We also explain
the connection between approximate auctions and polygon approximation. In Section 5 we
present an instance of the FedEx problem that requires a menu complexity of Ω(n2) in order to
approximate the revenue within 1−O(1/n2). In Section 7 we use similar techniques to those of
Section 3 to construct an example resolving an open question of [DW17].5
2 Preliminaries
We consider a single bidder who’s type depends on two parameters: a value v and a deadline
i ∈ [n]. Deterministic outcomes that the seller can award are just a day ∈ [n] to ship the item,
or to not ship the item at all (and the seller may also randomize over these outcomes). A buyer
receives value v if the item is shipped by her deadline, and 0 if it is shipped after her deadline
(or not at all).
The types (v, i) are drawn from a known (possibly correlated) distribution F . Let qi denote
the probability that the bidder’s deadline is i and Fi the marginal distribution of v conditioned
on a deadline of i. For simplicity of exposition, in several parts of this paper we’ll assume that F
is supported on {0, 1, . . . , vmax} × {1, . . . , n}. This assumption is w.l.o.g., and all results extend
to continuous distributions, or distributions with arbitrary discrete support if desired [CDW16].
In Appendix A, we provide the standard linear program whose solution yields the revenue-
optimal auction for the FedEx problem. We only note here the relevant incentive compatibility
constraints (observed in [FGKK16]). First, note that w.l.o.g. whenever the buyer has deadline
i, the optimal mechanism can ship her the item (if at all) exactly on day i. Shipping the item
earlier doesn’t make her any happier, but might make the buyer interested in misreporting and
claiming a deadline of i if her deadline is in fact earlier. Next note that, subject to this, the
buyer never has an incentive to overreport her deadline, but she still might have incentive to
underreport her deadline (or misreport her value).
5Specifically, [DW17] ask whether the optimal mechanism for a single buyer with a private budget and a regular
value distribution conditioned on each possible budget is deterministic. The answer is yes if we replace “regular”
with “decreasing marginal revenues,” or “private budget” with “public budget.” We show that the answer is no in
general: the optimal mechanism, even subject to regularity, could be randomized.
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We will be interested in understanding the menu complexity of auctions, which is the number
of different outcomes that, depending on the buyer’s type, are ever selected. If pi(v, i) denotes the
probability that a buyer with value v and deadline i receives the item, then we define the i-deadline
menu complexity to be the number of distinct options on deadline i (|{p|∃v, pi(v, i) = p}|). The
menu complexity then just sums the i-deadline menu complexities, and we will sometimes refer
also to the “deadline menu complexity” as the maximum of the i-deadline menu complexities.
2.1 Optimal auctions for the FedEx problem
Here, we recall some tools from [FGKK16] regarding optimal mechanisms for the FedEx problem.
The first tool they use is the notion of a revenue curve.6
Definition 2.1 (Revenue curves). For a given deadline i, define the ith revenue curve Ri so
that
Ri(v) = qi · v · Pr
x←Fi
[x ≥ v].
Intuitively, Ri(v) captures the achievable revenue by setting price v exclusively for consumers
on deadline i. It is also necessary to consider the ironed revenue curve, defined below.
Definition 2.2 (Ironed revenue curves). For any revenue curve Ri, define R˜i to be its upper
concave envelope.7 We say R˜i is ironed at v if R˜i(v) 6= Ri(v), and we call [x, y] an ironed
interval of R˜i if R˜i is not ironed at x or y, but is ironed at v for all v ∈ (x, y).
Of course, it is not sufficient to consider each possible deadline of the buyer in isolation. In
particular, offering certain options on day i constrains what can be offered on days ≥ i subject
to incentive compatibility. For instance, if some (v, i) pair receives the item with probability 1
on day 1 for price p, no bidder with a deadline ≥ 1 will ever choose to pay > p. So we would also
like a revenue curve that captures the optimal revenue we can make from days ≥ i conditioned
on selling the item deterministically at price p on day i. It’s not obvious how to construct such
a curve, but this is one of the main contributions of [FGKK16], stated below.
Definition 2.3. Let R≥n(v) := Rn(v), and r≥n := arg maxv R≥n(v). Define for i = n− 1 to 1:
R≥i(v) =
{
Ri(v) + R˜≥i+1(v) v < r≥i+1
Ri(v) + R˜≥i+1(r≥i+1) v ≥ r≥i+1.
Lemma 2.1 ([FGKK16]). R≥i(v) is the optimal revenue of any mechanism that satisfy the
following:
• The buyer can either receive the item on day i and pay v, or receive nothing/pay nothing.
• The buyer cannot receive the item on any day < i.
Moreover, for any v1 < . . . < vk, and ai(1), . . . , ai(k) ≥ 0 such that
∑
j ai(j) ≤ 1,
∑
j ai(j)R≥i(vj)
is the optimal revenue of any mechanism that satisfy the following:
• The buyer can receive the item on day i with probability ∑j≤` ai(j) and pay ∑j≤` ai(j)vj,
for any ` ∈ [k] (or not receive the item on day i and pay nothing).
• The buyer cannot receive the item on any day < i.
6For those familiar with revenue curves, note that this revenue curve is intentionally drawn in value space, and
not quantile space.
7That is, R˜i is the smallest concave function such that R˜i(x) ≥ Ri(x) for all x.
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Finally, we describe the optimal mechanism provided by [FGKK16], which essentially places
mass optimally upon each day’s revenue curve, subject to constraints imposed by the decisions
of previous days (a more detailed description appears in Appendix A, but the description below
will suffice for our paper). First, simply set any price p maximizing R≥1(p) to receive the item
on day 1 (as day 1 is unconstrained by previous days). Now inductively, assume that the options
for day i have been set and we’re deciding what to do for day i+ 1. If the menu options offered
on day i are (pi0, p0), . . . , (pik, pk) (interpret the option (pij , pj) as “charge pj to ship the item
on day i with probability pij”), think of this instead as a distribution over prices, where price
pj−pj−1
pij−pij−1 has mass pij − pij−1.8 For each such price p, it will undergo one of the following three
operations to become an option for day i+ 1.
• If p ≥ r≥i+1, move all mass from p to r≥i+1.
• If Rˆ≥i+1 is not ironed at p, and p ≤ r≥i+1, keep all mass at p.
• If Rˆ≥i+1 is ironed at p, and p ≤ r≥i+1, let [x, y] denote the ironed interval containing p,
and let qx+ (1− q)y = p. Move a q fraction of the mass at p to x, and a (1− q) fraction
of the mass at p to y.
Once the mass is resettled, if there is mass ai(j) on price pj for p1 < . . . < pk, the buyer will
have the option to receive the item on day i with probability
∑
j≤` ai(j) for price
∑
j≤` ai(j)pj
for any ` ∈ [k] (or not at all). Note that due to case three in the transformation above, there
could be up to twice as many menu options on day i as day i− 1.
Theorem 2.2 ([FGKK16]). The allocation rule described above is the revenue-optimal auction.
3 Optimal Mechanisms Require Exponential Menu Complexity
In this section we overview our construction for an instance of the FedEx problem with vmax
integral values for each day and n ≤ log(vmax) days where the i-deadline menu complexity of
the optimal mechanism is 2i−1 for all i (and this is the maximum possible [FGKK16]), implying
that the menu complexity is 2n − 1. Note that the deadline menu complexity is always upper
bounded by vmax, so vmax must be at least 2
n.
At a high level, constructing the example appears straight-forward, once one understands
Fiat et al.’s algorithm (end of Section 2). Every menu option from day i is either “shifted” to
r≥i+1, “copied,” or “split.” If the option is shifted or copied, it spawns only a single menu option
on day i+ 1, while if split it spawns two (hence the upper bound of 2n − 1). So the goal is just
to construct an instance where every option is split on every day.
Unfortunately, this is not quite so straight-forward: whether or not an option is split depends
on whether it lies inside an ironed interval in this R≥i curve, which is itself the sum of revenue
curves (some ironed and some not), and going back and forth between distributions and sums
of revenue curves is somewhat of a mess. So really what we’d like to do is construct the R≥i
curves directly, and be able to claim that there exists a FedEx input inducing them. While not
every profile (R≥1, . . . , R≥n) of curves is valid, we do provide a broad class of curves for which it
is somewhat clean to show that there exists a FedEx input inducing them.
From here, it is then a matter of ensuring that we can find the revenue curve profiles we
want (where for every day i, every menu option is split, because it is inside an ironed interval in
R≥i) within our class. We’ll highlight parts of our construction below, but most details are in
Appendix B.
Lemma 3.1. For any vmax and n ≤ log(vmax), there exists an input to the FedEx problem such
that:
8This is the standard transformation between “lotteries” and “distributions over prices” (e.g. [RZ83]).
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• R1 is maximized at vmax/2 (that is, R1(vmax/2) ≥ R1(x) ∀x) and has no ironed intervals.
• For all i > 1, R˜i has a maximizer at price v ≥ 2i(2n−i − 1) and has ironed intervals
[2n−i + k2n−i+2, 2n−i + k2n−i+2 + 2n−i+1] for k ∈ {0, . . . , 2i−2 − 1}.
• R˜i (the ironed revenue curve) is a constant function for all i ≥ 2.9
• R≥i has the same ironed intervals as Ri. In fact, ∀x, R≥i(x) = Ri(x)+c for some constant
c.
We include in Figure 2 a picture of the generated revenue curves for n = 4. As a result
of this construction, we see that R≥i has 2i−2 ironed intervals, whose endpoints themselves
lie in ironed intervals of R≥i+1. This guarantees that all menu options from day i (which are
guaranteed to be endpoints of ironed intervals) are split into two options on day i+ 1. The proof
of Theorem 3.2 (which implies Theorem 1.1) formalizes this.
Theorem 3.2. The optimal mechanism for any instance satisfying the conditons of Lemma 3.1
has i-deadline complexity 2i−1 for all i, and menu complexity 2n − 1.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is presented at the end of Section B of the Appendix.
4 Approximately Optimal Mechanisms with Small Menus
In this section, we describe a mechanism that attains at least 1 − ε fraction of the optimal
revenue for any FedEx instance with menu complexity O
(
n
√
n
ε min
(
n
ε , log vmax
))
, which proves
Theorem 1.2. Most proofs appear in Appendix C, but we overview our approach here.
Our main approach is to use the polygon approximation of concave functions applied to
revenue curves. For a sequence of points X in the domain of a function f , the polygon
approximation f˜X of a function with respect to X is the piecewise linear function formed by
connecting the points (x, f(x)) for x ∈ X by line segments. Thus, if the sequence X has n
points, the function f˜X will have n − 1 segments. For a concave function f , the line joining
(x1, f(x1)) and (x2, f(x2)) for any two points x1 and x2, lies entirely below the function f . Thus,
for concave functions f , we have for any sequence X, the value of f(x)− f˜X(x) ≥ 0. Typically,
for a ‘good’ polygon approximation, one requires for ε > 0, that f(x)− ε ≤ f˜X(x) ≤ f(x).
It turns out that the question of approximating revenue with low menu complexity boils down
to a question of approximating revenue curves with piecewise-linear functions of few segments.
The connection isn’t quite obvious, but isn’t overly complicated. Without getting into formal
details, here is a rough sketch of what’s going on:
• Recall the Fiat et al. procedure to build the optimal mechanism: menu options from
deadline i− 1 might be “split” into two options for deadline i if they lie inside an ironed
interval of R˜≥i. This might cause the menu complexity to double from one deadline to the
next.
• Instead, we want to create at most k “anchoring points” on each revenue curve. For a
menu option from deadline i− 1, instead of distributing it to the endpoints of its ironed
interval, we distribute it to the two nearest anchor points.
• By Lemma 2.1, we know exactly how to evaluate the revenue lost by this change, and it turns
out this is captured by the maximum gap between R˜≥i(·) and the polygon approximation
obtained to R˜≥i(·) (this isn’t obvious, but not hard. See Appendix C).
9Note that it is possible for two disjoint ironed intervals to have the same slope.
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• Finally, it turns out that the i-deadline menu complexity with at most k anchoring points is
at most 2k (also not quite obvious, but also not hard). So the game is to find few anchoring
points that obtain a good polygon approximation to each revenue curve. Corollary 4.1 of
Proposition C.7 describes the reduction formally, but all related proofs are in Appendix C.
Corollary 4.1. Consider a FedEx instance with n deadlines. For all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, let gi be
the function R˜≥i defined in 2.3, and let Xi be a sequence of ki points in [0, r≥i] such that for all
x ≤ r≥i, we have gi(x)− εi ≤ g˜iXi(x) ≤ gi(x). Then there exists a mechanism with i-deadline
menu complexity 2ki (and menu complexity 2
∑
i ki) whose revenue is at least OPT−
∑n
i=1 εi.
Here, OPT denotes the optimal revenue of the FedEx instance.
At this point, it seems like the right approach is to just set each εi = ε · OPT/n and plug
into the best existing bounds on polygon approximation. In some sense this is correct, but the
menu complexity bounds one would obtain are far from optimal. The main insight is that we
know something about the curves we wish to approximate: R˜(x) ≤ OPT for all x, and we want
to leverage this fact if it can give us better guarantees. Additionally, if all values are integral
in the range {1, . . . , vmax}, we wish to leverage this fact as well, as it implies that an additive
ε loss is also OK, as OPT ≥ 1. It turns out that both facts can indeed be leveraged to obtain
much stronger approximation guarantees than what are already known (essentially replacing
vmax with ln(vmax) in previous bounds), stated in Theorem 4.2 below.
Theorem 4.2. For any ε > 0 and concave function f : [0, vmax]→ [0,∞) such that f(0) = 0,
f+(0) ≤ 1, f−(vmax) ≥ 010, there exists a sequence X of at most O
(
min
{
1/ε,
√
log vmax
ε
})
points such that for all x ∈ [0, vmax],
f(x)− ε (1 + f(vmax)) ≤ f˜X(x) ≤ f(x).
The proof of Theorem 1.2 follows from Corollary 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 together with a little
bit of algebra, and is deferred until Appendix C.
Finally, we remark on some alternative terms that can be taken to replace vmax in Theorem 1.2.
It will become clear why these replacements are valid after reading the proof of Theorem 1.2,
but we will not further justify the validity of these replacements here.
• First, for instances with integral valuations, we may replace vmax everywhere with maxi r≥i.
This is essentially because we don’t actually need to approximate R˜≥i on the entire interval
[0, vmax], but only the interval [0, r≥i].
• We may further define q = maxi r≥i/OPT for any (not necessarily integral, possibly
continuous) instance, and replace vmax everywhere with q, even for non-integral instances.
This is essentially because we only used the integrality assumption to guarantee that
OPT ≥ 1.
• Finally, if p≥i denotes the probability that the buyer has value at least r≥i and deadline at
least i, observe that OPT ≥ r≥i · p≥i. So if the probability of sale at each r≥i is at least p,
we may observe that q ≥ 1/p (where q is defined as in the previous bullet) and replace
vmax with 1/p everywhere.
The bullets above suggest that the “hard” instances (where some instance-specific parameter
shows up in order to maintain optimal dependence on ε) are those where most of the revenue
comes from very infrequent events where the buyer has an unusually high value. Due to
the intricate interaction between different deadlines, these parameters can’t be circumvented
with simple discretization arguments, or by improved polygon approximations (provably, see
Section 4.1), but it is certainly interesting to see if other arguments might allow one to replace
log vmax with (for example) something like log(n/ε).
10We use f+ to denote the right hand derivative and f− to denote the left hand derivative.
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4.1 A tight example for polygon approximation
It turns out that the guarantees provided by Theorem 4.2 are tight. Specifically, if no dependence
on vmax is desired, then 1/ε is the best bound achievable. Also, if it’s acceptable to depend
on both vmax and ε, then the bound of
√
log vmax
ε in Theorem 4.2 is tight. Taken together, this
means that O
(
min
{
1/ε,
√
log vmax
ε
})
lies at the Pareto frontier of the dependences achievable
as a function of both vmax and ε. The examples proving tightness of these bounds are actually
quite simple, and provably the worst possible examples (proof of the below claim appears in
Appendix C)
Proposition 4.3. Let f be a concave function on [0, vmax], and let there be no polygon approxi-
mation of f using k segments for additive error ε. Then there exists a concave function g over
[0, vmax] satisfying:
• There is no polygon approximation of g using k segments for additive error ε.
• f(0) = g(0), f+(0) = g+(0), f(vmax) = g(vmax), f−(vmax) = g−(vmax).
• g is piecewise-linear with 2k segments.
5 Tightness of the approximation scheme
Finally, we construct an instance of the FedEx problem that is hard to approximate with small
menu complexity. We try to reason similar to the example constructed in Section 3, but things
are trickier here. In particular, the challenge in Section 3 was in mapping between distributions
and revenue curves. But once we had the revenue curves, it was relatively straight-forward to
plug through Fiat et al.’s algorithm [FGKK16] and ensure that the optimal auction had high
menu complexity.
Already nailing down the behavior of an optimal auction was tricky enough, but we now have
to consider every approximately optimal auction (almost all of which don’t necessarily result
from Fiat et al.’s algorithm (see, e.g. Section 4)). Indeed, one can imagine doing all sorts of
strange things on any day i that are suboptimal, but might somehow avoid the gradual buildup
in the i-deadline menu complexity.11
To cope with this, our approach has two phases: first, we characterize a restricted class of
auctions that we call clean. At a very high level, clean auctions never make “bizarre” choices on
day i that both decrease the revenue gained on day i and strictly increase constraints on choices
available for future days. To have an example in mind: if the revenue on day 1 is maximized by
setting a price of 1, it might make sense to set price 2 to receive the item on day 1 instead, as
this relaxes constraints on future days, and maybe this somehow helps when also constrained
by menu complexity. But it makes no sense to instead set price 1/2: this only decreases the
revenue achieved on day 1, and provides stricter constraints on future days (as now she has the
option to get the item on day 1 at a cheaper price).
For our example, we first show that all clean auctions that maintain a good approximation
ratio must have high menu complexity. We then follow up by making the claims in the previous
paragraph formal: any arbitrary auction of low menu complexity can be derived by “muddling”
a clean auction, a process which never increases the revenue. A little more specifically, cleaning
the menu for deadline i can only increase the revenue and allow more options on later deadlines,
without increasing the menu complexity. Formal definitions and claims related to this appear in
Appendix D. We conclude with a formal statement of our lower bound, which proves Theorem 1.3.
11For example, an ε-approximate menu could set price 0 or ∞ with probability ε for shipment on any day, or
something much more chaotic.
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Theorem 5.1. Any mechanism for the FedEx instance described in subsection D.1 that has at
most n/8 menu options on a day i ∈ (n/4, n/2] has revenue at most OPT (1− 1
200000n2
)
.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We provide the first nearly-tight quantitative results on menu complexity in a multi-dimensional
setting. Along the way, we design new polygon approximations for a hybrid additive-multiplicative
guarantee that turns out to be just right for our application (as evidenced by the nearly-matching
lower bounds obtained from the same ideas).
There remains lots of future work in the direction of menu complexity, most notably the push
for tighter quantitative bounds in “truly” multi-dimensional settings, where the gaps between
upper (exponential) and lower (polynomial) are vast. We believe that continuing a polygon
approximation approach is likely to yield fruitful results. After all, there is a known connection
between concave functions and any mechanism design setting via utility curves, and low menu
complexity exactly corresponds to piece-wise linear utility curves with few segments. Still,
there are two serious barriers to overcome: first, these utility curves are now multi-dimensional
instead of single-dimensional revenue curves. And second, the relationship between utility curves
and revenue is somewhat odd (expected revenue is equal to an integral over the support of
~x ·∆f (~x)− f(~x)), whereas the relationship between revenue curves and revenue is more direct.
There are also intriguing directions for future work along the lines of one-and-a-half dimensional
mechanism design, the most pressing of which is understanding multi-bidder instances (as all
existing work, including ours, is still limited to the single-bidder setting).
7 Instances with regular distributions may require randomness
For single-dimensional settings, it’s well-understood that “the right” technical condition on
value distributions to guarantee a simple optimal mechanism is regularity. This guarantees
that “virtual values” are non-decreasing and removes the need for ironing, even for multi-bidder
settings. Interestingly, “the right” technical condition on value distributions to guarantee a simple
optimal mechanism for 1.5 dimensional settings is no longer regularity, but decreasing marginal
values. For example, if all marginals satisfy decreasing marginal values, the optimal mechanism
is deterministic for the FedEx problem [FGKK16], selling a single item to a budget-constrained
buyer [CG00, DW17], and a capacity-constrained buyer [DHP17].
Still, regularity seems to buy something in these problems. For instance, Fiat et al. show
that when there are only two possible deadlines, regularity suffices to guarantee that the optimal
mechanism is deterministic. It has also been known since early work of Laffont and Robert
that regularity suffices to guarantee that the optimal mechanism is deterministic when selling
to a budget-constrained buyer with only one possible budget [LR96]. But the extent to which
regularity guarantees simplicity remained open (and was explicitly stated as such in [DW17]).
In this section, we show that regularity guarantees nothing beyond what was already known. In
particular, there exists an instance of the FedEx problem with three possible deadlines where all
marginals are regular but the optimal mechanism is randomized. This immediately implies an
example for a budget-constrained buyer and three possible budgets as well (for instance, just set
all three budgets larger than vmax so they will never bind).
We proceed by describing now our instance of the FedEx problem where the optimal auction
is randomized, despite all marginals being regular and there only being 3 possible deadlines (recall
that Fiat et al. show that the optimal auction remains deterministic for regular marginals and 2
deadlines).Throughout this section, instead of using revenue curves R(v), we use Γ(v) = −R(v).
This is in accordance to [FGKK16].
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7.1 The setting
Consider bidders with types distributed as F1 on day 1, F2 on day 2, and F3 on day 3.
F1(v) = 1− e−v, f1(v) = e−v,
F2(v) = 1− e−5v, f2(v) = 5e−5v,
F3(v) = 1− e− v5 , f3(v) = 1
5
e−
v
5 .
The distribution over days q is
q1 =
10
21
q2 =
10
21
q3 =
1
21
.
Note that the three distributions are regular but don’t have decreasing marginal revenues.
Figure 1: (Left) The curve Γˆ≥2 in our example. (Right) The curve Γ≥1. Note that this curve is
minimized at a point in the ironed interval of Γˆ≥2.
7.2 Analysis
We use the iterative procedure described in [FGKK16] to find the optimal auction.
Γ≥3 = − v
21
(1− F3(v)) = − v
21
e−
v
5 ,
r≥3 = 5.
Γ≥2 =
{
Γ2(v) + Γˆ≥3(v), 0 ≤ v ≤ 5
Γ2(v)− 521e , 5 ≤ v
=
{
−10v21 e−5v − v21e−
v
5 , 0 ≤ v ≤ 5
−10v21 e−5v − 521e , 5 ≤ v
r≥2 ≈ 5.0 · · ·
Γ≥1 =
{
Γ1(v) + Γˆ≥2(v), 0 ≤ v ≤ 5.0 · · ·
Γ1(v)− 521e , 5.0 · · · ≤ v
=

−10v21 e−v − 10v21 e−5v − v21e−
v
5 , 0 ≤ v ≤ 0.245 · · ·
−10v21 e−v −A line. See Figure 1, 0.245· · · ≤ v ≤ 2.79· · ·
−10v21 e−v − 10v21 e−5v − v21e−
v
5 , 2.79 · · · ≤ v ≤ 5.0 · · ·
−10v21 e−v − 0.0876 · · · , 5.0 · · · ≤ v
r≥1 ≈ 1.07.
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All real values written are approximate and end with “· · · ”. The case in boldface denotes the
ironed interval. The optimal price for day 1 is 1.07 which is in that interval. Hence the optimal
auction has to be randomized.
Appendices
A Additional preliminaries
In this appendix, we summarize the approach in [FGKK16] to obtain the optimal mechanism for
an arbitrary “FedEx” instance. We begin with the linear program that encodes this optimization
problem.
maximize
∑
i
∑
v
qifi(v)p(v, i)
subject to pi(v, i)v − p(v, i) ≥ pi(v − 1, i)v − p(v − 1, i) ∀v ≥ 1, i (Leftwards IC)
pi(v, i)v − p(v, i) ≥ pi(v + 1, i)v − p(v + 1, i) ∀v < vmax, i (Rightwards IC)
pi(v, i)v − p(v, i) ≥ pi(v, i− 1)v − p(v, i− 1) ∀i > 1, v (Downwards IC)
pi(v, i) ≤ 1 ∀i, v (Feasibility)
pi(0, 1) = p(0, 1) = 0. (Individual Rationality)
(1)
Note that we have not included the constraints where the bidder misreports a higher deadline.
No rational bidder would consider these deviations since they would always get non-positive
utility. We now formally present the allocation curves described in Section 2. This, combined
with the definitions of optimal revenue curves, provide a clean characterization of optimal
auctions for any instance of the FedEx problem.
Definition A.1 (Optimal allocation curves [FGKK16]). Let j∗ be the largest j such that vj ≤ r≥i.
For any j ≤ j∗, consider two cases:
• Rˆ≥i is not ironed at vj. Then
ai,j(v) =
{
0 v < vj
1 else.
• Rˆ≥i is ironed at vj. Let vj be the largest v < vj such that R≥i is not ironed at v and vj be
the smallest vj < v such that R≥i is not ironed at v. Let 0 < δ < 1 be such that
vj = δvj + (1− δ)vj .
Define
ai,j(v) =

0 v < vj
δ vj ≤ v ≤ vj
1 v > vj .
Then set ai(v) as follows
ai(v) =
{ ∑j∗
j=1(βj − βj−1)ai,j(v) v < r≥i
1 v ≥ r≥i,
where βj is the probability of allocating the item with value aj on day i− 1.
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Lemma A.1. [FGKK16] The allocation curves ai are monotone increasing from 0 to 1 and
satisfy the Downwards IC from 1. Moreover, each ai changes value only at points where Rˆ≥i is
not ironed.
Remark A.1. Every solution to LP 1 is an optimal mechanism for the FedEx problem.
In addition, we present this simple claim, which is unrelated to the FedEx problem itself,
that will be useful in future sections.
Claim A.1. Let f be a distribution over [vmax], and let φf , Rf be the corresponding virtual
value and revenue curve, respectively. Then, for all v ∈ [vmax − 1]
Rf (v)−Rf (v − 1) = φf (v)f(v).
Proof. This follows from some simple calculations:
Rf (v)−Rf (v − 1) = v(1− F (v − 1))− (v + 1)(1− F (v))
= v(F (v)− F (v − 1))− (1− F (v))
= vf(v)− (1− F (v)) = f(v)φf (v).
B Omitted proofs and perturbed example of Section 3
B.1 Omitted proofs
Lemma B.1. Fix v > 0. Let (2v)−1 > ε > 0 and let R = {ri}vi=1 be a sequence of real numbers
such that |ri+1 − ri| ≤ ε,∀i ∈ [v − 1]. If r1 = 1, there exists a distribution f : [v]→ [0, 1] such
that Rf (i) = ri, ∀i ∈ [v].
Proof. By our choice of ε, all elements in the sequence are greater than 1/2. Let rv+1 = 0 and
define
F (i) = 1− ri+1
i+ 1
,∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , v}.
We will show that F indeed corresponds to a valid distribution function by showing that it
is non-negative and non-decreasing. Once we have shown this, it becomes clear that Rf (i) = ri,
proving the Lemma.
Claim B.1. F (i) is non-negative, non-decreasing.
Proof. For i = 0, F (i) = 1 − 1 = 0. Suppose i ≥ 1. Since 0 ≤ ri < 2,∀i, it follows that
1 ≥ F (i) ≥ 1 − ri+12 > 0. To show it is non-decreasing, consider the difference between two
consecutive terms. For all v > i ≥ 1,
F (i)− F (i− 1) = ri
i
− ri+1
i+ 1
=
ri
i(i+ 1)
+
ri − ri+1
i+ 1
≥ 1
i+ 1
(ri
i
− ε
)
>
1
i+ 1
(
ri
v
− 1
2v
)
≥ 0.
For i = v, F (i)− F (i− 1) = rii ≥ 0.
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We are now ready to explicitly construct an example that achieves deadline menu complexity
of 2n−1 where vmax = 2n − 1. Fix n and construct n − 1 sequences Si = {sij}2n−1j=1 of length
2n − 1, then
sij = ε · (1− 2bi+1(j))bi(j)
(
i−1∏
k=1
(1− bk(j))
)
,
where bi(j) denotes the i-th least significant bit in the binary expansion of j, ε = 4
−n.
Let Sn = {snj}2n−1j=1 as snj = ε(2bn(j) − 1). Lemma B.1 implies that there exist distributions
fj ∀j ∈ [n] such that φfjf(j) = si∀i ∈ [v − 1]. In our construction the type distribution of
day i corresponds to the distribution fn+1−i. Let the distribution over days be uniform (i.e.
qi =
1
n∀i ∈ [n]). In order to show that this construction achieves a menu complexity of 2n−1 we
first need to characterize the revenue curves for all days, and then show that an optimal auction
exists where prices can be set so as to create a large menu. The intuition for these revenue curves
is that their ironed intervals are nested: prices at the endpoints of ironed intervals on day i are
the midpoints of new ironed intervals on day i+ 1. In addition, after ironing the curves, they
look like constants. Therefore, the optimal revenue curves will have the same ironed intervals
as their original counterparts. We design the revenue of the first day to be maximized at the
median value. On the next day this price will belong to an ironed interval, meaning that any
optimal auction must offer a lottery over two prices that are not ironed for day 2. The size of
the lottery offered directly translate into the minimum number of options a menu for that day
must have. By the nesting construction, this will double the number of options offered on day
i+ 1 with respect to day i.
We can now use the above construction, combined with Claim A.1 and Lemma B.1, to show
a more general result, Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By simple examination, the revenue curve for day 1 is just a line that
increases until it reaches vmax/2 and then decreases, so it is maxed at vmax/2. Consider day
i ≥ 2. The sequence that generates its revenue curve, sn+1−i,j is non-zero iff j has remainder
2n−i mod 2n−i+1. Since there are 2n − 1 values in the sequence, there will be 2i−1 non-zero
values. These values will alternate between ε,−ε and each alternation creates one ironed interval:
the revenue decreases by ε, stays at that value for a while, and increases by ε again. This gives
2i−2 ironed intervals for the revenue curve of day i. Moreover, the last price where the revenue
increases is at 2i(2n−i+1 − 1), making it a valid maximizer. The revenue remains constant from
there on so any higher value is also a maximizer.
For the third point, note that Ri takes values in {1, 1 − ε}, alternating between them for
intervals whose lengths depend on i. Rˆi, the upper concave hull of Ri, is then a constant function
with value 1 everywhere.
We prove the last point by induction, starting from Rn. This holds because Rn = R≥n. Note
that, from our previous claim, Rˆ≥n = Rˆn is a constant function. Suppose that R≥i+1(v) =
Ri+1(v) + c for some c. For v ≤ r≥i+1, R≥i(v) = Ri(v) + Rˆ≥i+1(v). For v > r≥i+1, R≥i(v) =
Ri(v) + Rˆ≥i+1(r≥i+1). In either case, the term added to Ri(v) is a constant (and it is the same
constant) by the inductive hypothesis, so the claim follows.
Lemma B.2. The series of optimal revenue curves R≥i induced by the distributions fn+1−i
is such that on any day i, an optimal allocation curve as constructed by [FGKK16] is a step
function with 2i−1 jumps and takes the following form:
ai(v) =

0 v < 2n−i,
k+1
2i−1 2
n−i + k2n−i+1 ≤ v < 2n−i + (k + 1)2n−i+1,
1 v ≥ 2n − 2n−i,
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2i−1 − 2. Moreover, these prices where the function jumps on day i will belong to
ironed intervals for the optimal revenue curve of the following day, R≥i+1 for all i < n.
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Proof. We prove this also by induction going from the first day to the last. As stated before,
R≥1 is maximized at vmax/2 and has no ironed intervals, therefore it is clear r≥1 = vmax/2 and
the optimal allocation curve a1 corresponds to a step function at vmax/2. By construction, this
price belongs to an ironed interval of R≥2. Thus the base case holds. Suppose that the statement
is true for day i. We want to understand the optimal allocation curve for day i+ 1.
First note that the places where the function jumps on day i, Pi = {2n−i + k2n−i+1}2i−1−1k=0 ,
belong to ironed intervals of R≥i+1 (which are the same intervals as Ri+1). This is because
at these prices j ∈ Pi the function sn−i+1,j takes a value of 0. The nearest place where they
are non-zero are exactly at j − 2n−i−1 and j + 2n−i−1, where the function takes values ε and
−ε, meaning we are inside an iron interval (the revenue decreases and then increase by ε).
Thus by the optimal allocation curves suggested in [FGKK16] we observe that if on day i we
offered a price of 2n−i + k2n−i+1 with positive probability k+1
2i−1 , we must also allocate at prices
2n−i−1 + (2k)2n−i and 2n−i−1 + (2k + 1)2n−i on day i+ 1 with positive probability.
The probability for allocating the item with price 2n−i−1 + k2n−i ≤ v < 2n−i−1 + (k+ 1)2n−i
depends on the parity of k. If k is odd then the values in this range correspond to a non-ironed
interval on day i + 1, meaning they preserve the probability of allocation from day i. The
probability of allocating on the interval with endpoints 2n−i + (k−1)2
n−i+1
and 2n−i + k+12 2
n−i+1,
which contains our new interval of interest, is k+1
2i+1
. If k is even then we belong to an ironed
interval on day i + 1, meaning that the probability of allocation is going to be the average
of allocating on the two intervals on day i that intersect this one. These intervals are [2n−i +
k−2
2 2
n−i+1, 2n−i + k2 2
n−i+1] and [2n−i + k2 2
n−i+1, 2n−i + (k+2)2 2
n−i+1]. Thus the probability of
allocating at v on day i+ 1 is just k+1
2i+1
.
With this understanding of the revenue curves of the instance we construct, we are ready to
prove Theorem 3.2, the main result of Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. By Lemma B.2, the optimal allocation curves for day i are step-wise
increasing functions with 2i−1 steps. This means that for any deadline i, the i-deadline menu
complexity of this instance is 2i−1. Combining the number of options offered over all n days
gives a menu complexity of 2n − 1.
B.2 Perturbed case
In this appendix, we show how to tweak the example in Section 3 so that no optimal auction has
a menu complexity less than 2n. The problem with the example in Section 3 is that we don’t
have to follow the allocation suggestion of [FGKK16] in order to achieve an optimal auction
because we could simply choose larger ironed intervals on every day that spanned the whole
spectrum of prices and (because of the simplicity of the construction) still recover all the revenue.
We add a small non-linear term to the revenue curve of each day to dissuade from this while
still preserving the ’nested’ structure of ironed intervals. Consider now the n− 1 sequences
sij =
ε
2
· (1− 2bi+1(j))bi(j)
(
i−1∏
k=1
(1− bk(j))
)
+ δj · (2vmax − j),
where vmax = 2
n,  = 14v and δ, the weight of the non-linear term, is v
−10. The distribution
for the first day is the same as the one we used for the previous case. Note that the non-linear
term added is maxed at vmax. Again, Lemma B.1, Claim A.1 allow us to conclude there are
revenue curves Ri and valid distributions fn+1−i, whose changes are dictated by the sequence
sn+1−i. We restate the results from 3 with the appropriate adjustments.
Lemma B.3. The series of revenue curves Ri induced by the distributions fn+1−i satisfy the
following properties:
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Figure 2: Revenue curves corresponding to an instantiation of our construction with n = 4 and
ε = .25.
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• R1 is maximized at vmax/2 and has no ironed intervals.
• Ri for 1 < i ≤ d has a unique maximizer at price vmax and has 2i−2 ironed intervals.
• R≥i has the same ironed intervals as Ri.
Proof. The first point remains true since we haven’t changed R1. Sine vmax was a maximizer of
the function before adding the non-linear term, it will remain a maximizer since it’s also optimal
for that function. In fact, it is now the unique maximizer. This implies that r≥n = vmax. The
last point follows from a similar inductive proof to the one in the original case. It is easy to see
that now R≥i will be maximized at vmax, for all i. Then by the characterization from [FGKK16]
we have that for any v < vmax, R≥i(v) = Ri(v).
The key property of Lemma B.2 is that the ironed intervals for day i are nested in those of
day i+ 1. This property is kept despite the small adjustment of the function, so the statement of
the Lemma remains and the proof of the main theorem of Section 3 follows. After the adjustment
the ironed intervals become unique and no clever algorithm can take large ironed intervals to
avoid a large menu complexity.
C Omitted proofs of Section 4
C.1 Polygon approximation of concave functions
Polygon approximation of functions is a classic problem in approximation theory. The central
problem in approximation theory is to see how ‘well’ does a class of ‘simple’ functions approximate
an arbitrary function. Usually, the ‘simple’ functions have a property that makes them easy to
study and the approximation scheme ensures that results carry over to arbitrary functions. In
the subfield of polygon approximation, the class of ‘simple’ functions is the set of all continuous
piecewise linear functions. Different error metrics (an error metric defines the properties of
a good approximation) are studied, the most common being an additive error defined by a
parameter ε. We define polygon approximation formally and state a celebrated result for additive
ε error.
Definition C.1 (Polygon approximation). Given a function f : [a, b]→ R and a sequence X of
points a = x0, x1, · · · , xn−1, xn = b, define f˜X , the X-approximation of f , to be the continuous
piecewise linear function that passes through (x0, f(x0)), (x1, f(x1)), · · · , (xn, f(xn)).
Before continuing, we briefly state the notation that we are going to use throughout this
section. For a concave function f , we use f+ to denote the right-derivative and f− to denote
the left derivative. We remind the reader that for a concave function over an interval, both f−
and f+ are well defined at every point (and there are only countably many points for which f is
not differentiable). The following theorem has been taken from [Rot92] and has been reworded
to fit our notation.
Theorem C.1 ([Rot92, BHR91]). For any ε > 0 and concave f : [a, b]→ R such that b− a = L
and f+(a) − f−(b) ≤ ∆, there exists a sequence X of at most 3 +
√
9
8
L∆
ε points such that
∀x ∈ [a, b], 0 ≤ f(x)− f˜X(x) ≤ ε.
Theorem C.1, as stated above, deals with arbitrary concave functions and is known to be
tight [Rot92]. In our setting of the FedEx problem, the concave functions that we wish to
approximate are monotone revenue curves defined over [0, r≥i] (for the rest of this section, we
will use vmax instead of r≥i to refer to the right end-point of the interval to keep the notation
non-specific to the FedEx problem). Being monotone revenue curves, they satisfy many other
properties, e.g., f(0) = 0, f+(x) ≤ 1, and f−(x) ≥ 0. Also, the error that we are interested in
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is not the additive ε error that is dealt with in the theorem. Lemma C.3 formalizes the exact
guarantees we desire. Note that the error metric that we use is an additive multiplicative hybrid
that increases with f(vmax). To prove this lemma, we use Theorem C.1 separately on each
of the intervals [0, 1], [1, 2], · · · , [vmax/4, vmax/2], [vmax/2, vmax]. We show that when the size of
the approximating sequence X is large in these intervals, then f(vmax) must be large. In turn,
this implies that we have more wiggle room in our error. We exploit this room to improve the
dependence on vmax to logarithmic from the polynomial dependence on L in Theorem C.1.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
We begin with an easy lemma: Lemma C.2 shows how to lower bound f(vmax) using the
derivatives of various points along the way.
Lemma C.2. For any concave f : [0, vmax]→ [0,∞) such that f−(vmax) ≥ 0, we have
f(vmax) ≥
dlog vmaxe∑
i=0
f+
(vmax
2i
) vmax
2i+1
.
Proof. Since the function f is concave, we get that for all i > 0,
f
(vmax
2i−1
)
− f
(vmax
2i
)
≥ f+
(vmax
2i−1
) vmax
2i
.
Adding these inequalities for i = 1, 2, · · · dlog vmaxe+ 1, we get
f(vmax) ≥
dlog vmaxe+1∑
i=1
f+
(vmax
2i−1
) vmax
2i
≥
dlog vmaxe∑
i=0
f+
(vmax
2i
) vmax
2i+1
.
And now, we show how to improve the depends on vmax from linear to logarithmic for our
relaxed hybrid guarantee.
Lemma C.3. For any ε > 0 and concave function f : [0, vmax] → [0,∞) such that f(0) = 0,
f+(0) ≤ 1, f−(vmax) ≥ 0, there exists a sequence X of at most O
(
log vmax +
√
log vmax
ε
)
points
such that for all x ∈ [0, vmax],
f(x)− ε (1 + f(vmax)) ≤ f˜X(x) ≤ f(x).
Proof. We divide the domain of the function f into the intervals Ii =
[
vmax
2i
, vmax
2i−1
]
for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · dlog vmaxe} and the interval I0 =
[
0, vmax
2dlog vmaxe
]
. For each interval Ii, we define a
sequence Xi that approximates f well over this interval. The final sequence X is obtained by
combining all the sequences Xi.
We start with the interval I0. The length of I0 is
vmax
2dlog vmaxe ≤ 1. Since f+(0) ≤ 1, we
can apply Theorem C.1 with ∆ = 1 and conclude that to approximate f up to an additive
ε ≤ ε (1 + f(vmax)) error on this interval, we need a sequence X0 of at most 3 +
√
9
8ε points.
We now argue for the rest of the domain of f . The length Li of the interval Ii is
vmax
2i
.
Let ∆i = f
+
(
vmax
2i
) − f− (vmax
2i−1
)
. Applying Theorem C.1 on Ii with the error parameter
εf(vmax) ≤ ε (1 + f(vmax)) gives a sequence Xi at most 3 +
√
9
8
vmax∆i
2iεf(vmax)
points such that f˜Xi
approximates f on Ii up to an additive εf(vmax) error.
Combine all the sequences Xi for i = 0, 1, · · · , dlog vmaxe to get a single sequence X such
that f˜X approximates f up to an additive ε(1 + f(vmax)) throughout its domain [0, vmax]. The
number of points in X is at most
18
3 +
√
9
8ε
+
dlog vmaxe∑
i=1
3 +
√
9
8
vmax∆i
2iεf(vmax)
≤ 3(1 + dlog vmaxe) +
√
9
8ε
+
1√
εf(vmax)
dlog vmaxe∑
i=1
√
9
8
vmax∆i
2i
≤ 3(1 + dlog vmaxe) +
√
9
8ε
+
1√
εf(vmax)
√√√√dlog vmaxe dlog vmaxe∑
i=1
9
8
vmax∆i
2i
(Cauchy-Schwarz)
≤ 3(1 + dlog vmaxe) +
√
9
8ε
+
1√
εf(vmax)
√√√√dlog vmaxe dlog vmaxe∑
i=1
9
8
vmaxf+
(
vmax
2i
)
2i
(Definition of ∆i)
≤ 3(1 + dlog vmaxe) +
√
9
8ε
+
√
18
8
dlog vmaxe
ε
(Lemma C.2)
= O
(
log vmax +
√
log vmax
ε
)
.
It is noteworthy that Lemma C.3 preserves the quadratic dependence on ε in Theorem C.1,
and simply replaces vmax with ln(vmax). Note that essentially the main idea is that we wish to
target additive error ε · f(vmax) in the domain of “large x” (as targeting an additive ε in this
range requires linear dependence on vmax that can be avoided if f(vmax) is big) but additive
error ε in the domain of “small x” (as targeting an additive ε requires linear dependence on
vmax which is small). So in order to get the improved guarantee, our bound needs the flexibility
to take either the additive or multiplicative approximation in the different ranges.
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2, we additionally provide a much simpler argument
showing that the dependence on vmax can be removed at the cost of suboptimal dependence on
ε.
Lemma C.4. For any ε > 0 and any increasing concave function f : [0, vmax] → [0,∞) such
that f(0) = 0, there exists a sequence X of at most O(1/ε) points such that for all x ∈ [0, vmax],
f(x)− εf(vmax) ≤ f˜X(x) ≤ f(x).
Proof. We divide the range [0, fmax] of the function f into 1/ε intervals and take one point from
each interval. Formally, let xi = minx{x | f(x) ≥ iεf(vmax)}, for all i ∈ {0, · · · , b1/εc}. Note
that since f is continuous (it is concave), f(xi) = iεf(vmax).
We define the sequence X to be the points {xi}b1/εci=0 followed by xb1/εc+1 = vmax. We
prove that f˜X is the required polygon approximation. For any point x ∈ [0, vmax], let i ∈
{0, 1, · · · , b1/εc} be such that xi ≤ x < xi+1. Since f is increasing, we have f(xi) ≤ f(x) ≤
f(xi+1). This gives iεf(vmax) ≤ f(x) ≤ (i+ 1)εf(vmax).
Since f˜X(x) is a piecewise linear function, we have f(xi) = f˜X(xi) ≤ f˜X(x) ≤ f˜X(xi+1) =
f(xi+1). Again, we get iεf(vmax) ≤ f˜X(x) ≤ (i+ 1)εf(vmax).
Combining the two inequalities, we get f(x)− f˜X(x) ≤ εf(vmax). Since f is concave, any
piecewise linear segment joining two points on the function lies below the function and we have:
0 ≤ f(x)− f˜X(x) ≤ εf(vmax).
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Given any function f , we can use either of the two polygon approximation schemes defined
by Lemma C.3 and Lemma C.4. Taking the better of these two schemes we get a proof
of Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let X1 and X2 be the sequences given by Lemma C.3 and Lemma C.4
respectively. Suppose 1/ε ≤ log vmax. In this case, the size of X1 is at most O(1/ε) =
O
(
min
{
1/ε,
√
log vmax
ε
})
. Now suppose 1/ε ≥ log vmax. In this case, the size of X2 is at most
O
(
log vmax +
√
log vmax
ε
)
= O
(√
log vmax
ε
)
= O
(
min
{
1/ε,
√
log vmax
ε
})
. Thus, the smaller of
the two sequence is of size at most O
(
min
{
1/ε,
√
log vmax
ε
})
.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Consider any increasing concave function f and a polygon approxi-
mation f˜X of f . Let X = {0 = x0, · · · , xk = vmax}. Since f is concave, the function f˜X lies
‘below’ the function f . Consider now the tangents to the function f drawn at points in X.
Since f is concave, these tangents are always ‘above’ the function f . The tangents can be
stitched together to define a function g that is always above the function f . Formally, define
g(x) = mini∈{0,...,k}{f(xi)+min{f−(xi) · (x−xi), f+(xi) · (x−xi)}}. Observe that f(xi) = g(xi),
f−(xi) = g−(xi), and f+(xi) = g+(xi) for all i, giving us the second bullet. Observe also that g
has at most 2k different slopes (because x0 and xk each only contribute one possibility, while
the rest contribute two possibilities), so it is piecewise-linear with at most 2k segments.
It remains to show that there exists a polygon approximation f˜X we can start with so that
there is no polygon approximation of g using k segments for additive error ε. Let X be k + 1
points so as to minimize maxx{f(x)− f˜X(x)}, and call this value δ (by hypothesis, δ > ε). This
guarantees us the following property on X:
max
x∈[xi,xi+1]
{f(x)− f˜X(x)} = δ for all i.
If not, then there is some i where maxx∈[xi,xi+1]{f(x) − f˜X(x)} < δ. xi could then be
moved a teeny bit to the left (making the approximation within the interval [xi, xi+1] a teeny
bit worse) so that maxx∈[xi,xi+1]{f(x)− f˜X(x)} remains < δ, but maxx∈[xi−1,xi]{f(x)− f˜X(x)}
becomes < δ as well (as it also makes the approximation within the interval [xi−1, xi] a teeny
bit better, and it was ≤ δ to begin with). Iterating this procedure would then let us make
maxx∈[xj ,xj+1]{f(x) − f˜X(x)} < δ for all j ≤ i. And a similar argument for moving xi+1 a
teeny bit to the right allows us to claim the same for j ≥ i. At the end, we have now made
maxx{f(x)− f˜X(x)} strictly less than δ, a contradiction.
Now that we have maxx∈[xi,xi+1]{f(x) − f˜X(x)} = δ > ε for all i, we can immediately see
that for any function g(·) with g(xi) = f(xi) for all i, and g(x) ≥ f(x) for all x, any Y such that
g˜Y (·) is an ε-approximation polygon approximation requires at least one point y ∈ Y ∩ [xi, xi+1].
So we can immediately see that g also has no polygon approximation using k segments for
additive error ε.
With this in mind, we’ll now restrict attention to piecewise-linear functions with not too
many segments. To this end, first consider a piecewise-linear function with just two segments.
The first segment is of length l1 with slope m1. Similarly, the second segment is of length
l2 and slope m2 < m1. If we wish to approximate this function using just one segment, the
segment should have length l1 + l2 and slope
m1l1+m2l2
l1+l2
. The error in this approximation will be
(m1−m2)l1l2
l1+l2
. This calculation says that the error roughly depends on the product of the slope
difference and the lengths. For our lower bound, we would wish to have many such segments
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combined together so that the error in all of the segments is the same. For a concave function,
the slope keeps decreasing as x grows. Thus, if the error has to be the same in every segment,
the lengths of each segment have to keep increasing so that the product is the same. Observe
that the function log(x) satisfies this property.
With this direction in mind, we now demonstrate a function that we call LPLk (for
logarithmically-piecewise-linear) that can’t be approximated using less than k segments. We
chose this name because the function has derivative 1/2i in the range [3(2i+1 − 2), 3(2i+2 − 2)]
which is (roughly) a constant factor away from the derivative 1/(x + 6) of the logarithmic
function ln(x+ 6). In fact, what we do can be seen as stitching together appropriate tangents to
the logarithmic curve. For a value of ε < 1/100, let k = 1100ε . Consider the following function
defined on [0, 3(2k+1 − 2) = vmax]:
LPLk(x) =

x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 3(22 − 2)
1
2(x− 3(22 − 2)) + 6, 3(22 − 2) < x ≤ 3(23 − 2)
1
4(x− 3(23 − 2)) + 12, 3(23 − 2) < x ≤ 3(24 − 2)
...
1
2k−1 (x− 3(2k − 2)) + 6(k − 1), 3(2k − 2) < x ≤ 3(2k+1 − 2).
The function LPLk satisfies ε(1 + LPLk(vmax)) = ε + 6kε ≤ 12 , and that f ′(0) ≤ 1,
f ′(vmax) ≥ 0. We prove that any good polygon approximation for LPLk(x) must have at least
Ω(k) segments. Since k = 1100ε , this proves that a dependence of 1/ε is unavoidable if we want
to be independent of vmax. Since in this example,
√
log vmax
ε = Θ(k), this also shows that the
bound in Theorem 4.2 is tight. The idea of our proof is to identify disjoint intervals such that
any sequence X that defines a good polygon approximation should have at least one point in
every such interval. We will identify Θ(k) such intervals for LPLk.
Lemma C.5. Suppose there exists a sequence X = {xi}i≥1 of points such that LPLk(x)−1/2 ≤
L˜PLkX(x) ≤ LPLk(x) for all x ∈ [0, vmax]. The sequence X has at least one point in the range
Ii = [3(2
i − 2)− 2i, 3(2i − 2) + 2i] for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof of Lemma C.5. Suppose for the sake of contradiction there is an i for which X∪Ii = φ. We
prove that the approximation doesn’t hold at the midpoint of Ii (call this m). Since no point of X
is in Ii and LPLk is concave, ˜LPLkX(m) is at most
1
2(LPLk(3(2
i−2)−2i)+LPLk(3(2i−2)+2i)).
Thus, LPLk(m)− ˜LPLkX(m) ≥ 6(i− 1)− 12 (6(i− 2) + 2 + 6(i− 1) + 2) = 1.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemma C.5.
Corollary C.6. An ε(1 +LPLk(vmax)) additive polygon approximation of LPLk above requires
at least k − 1 segments.
Corollary C.6 shows that the bounds of Theorem 4.2 are tight, both in the case that there is no
dependence on vmax, and in the case that we allow dependence vmax. Moreover, Proposition 4.3
shows that “LPL-like” functions exhibit the worst-case gaps for whatever kinds of guarantees
are desired.
C.4 From Polygon Approximation to Approximate Auctions
In this subsection we prove Proposition C.7 and Corollary 4.1 establishing the connection between
”small” polygon approximations and approximate auctions with low menu complexity. The high
level idea of the proof of Proposition C.7 is that the revenue generated by a mechanism on
days i through n is equal to a weighted sum of the function R≥i(·) evaluated at points where
the allocation curve changes (see Lemma 2.1). If a good polygon approximation of R≥i exists,
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then every point where the allocation curve changes can be substituted by the endpoints of the
segment of polygon approximation that contains it. The error in the polygon approximation
would become loss in revenue after this transformation. The number of segments (or endpoints)
in the polygon approximation would be the menu complexity of the transformed mechanism.
Thus, a good and small polygon approximation would generate an almost optimal and low menu
complexity mechanism. The proof of Corollary 4.1 relies on iteratively calling on Proposition C.7
from the first day to the last while keeping a check on the total revenue lost compared to the
optimal over all days.
Proposition C.7. Consider a FedEx instance with n deadlines. For i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, let g be
the function R˜≥i defined in 2.3, and let X be a sequence of k points in [0, r≥i] such that for
all x ≤ r≥i, we have g(x) − ε ≤ g˜X(x) ≤ g(x). Then for any mechanism M , there exists a
mechanism with the following properties:
• The menu offered on days 1, 2, · · · , i− 1 is the same as M .
• The i-deadline menu complexity is at most 2k.
• The revenue is at least OPTM,i − ε.
Here, OPTM,i denotes the optimal revenue for any mechanism that offers the same menu as
M on deadlines 1, 2, · · · , i− 1.
Intuitively, every segment of g˜X corresponds to a different menu option in the approximate
mechanism, and the fact that g˜X(x) and g(x) = R˜≥i(x) are close for all x implies that the
revenue of the mechanism based on g˜X isn’t far from optimal (by Lemma 2.1). The additional
factor of two comes from the fact that R˜≥i is ironed, so to “set price p” in R˜≥i, we might need
to randomize over two prices in R≥i.
Proof of Proposition C.7. We assume without loss of generality that the mechanism M does the
optimal pricing on days i through n (given the prices it sets on days 1 through i− 1). Thus, the
revenue generated by M is OPTM,i. The menu offered by any such mechanism on day i can be
seen as a distribution f over prices {pj}. The prices pj are all at most r≥i as the M behaves
optimally on day i (see A.1). Since the mechanism behaves optimally day i+ 1 onwards, the
revenue generated by M on days i through n is
∑
j f(pj)R≥i(pj) by Lemma 2.1.
Let X be the sequence of k points such that g(x)− ε ≤ g˜X(x) ≤ g(x) for all x ≤ r≥i. Since
g = R˜≥i is the upper concave envelope of R≥i, for every point x ≤ r≥i, there exists points xl ≤ x
and xr ≥ x in [0, r≥i] such that g(xl) = R≥i(xl), g(xr) = R≥i(xr), and for any λ ∈ [0, 1], we
have g (λxl + (1− λ)xr) = λg(xl) + (1 − λ)g(xr). For all points x ∈ X, we add the points xl
and xr to X and remove the point x. Adding the points xl and xr will only improve the quality
of the polygon approximation. Further, since g is linear on the interval [xl, xr] that contains
x, removing x doesn’t affect the quality of the polygon approximation. Thus, the new set X
satisfies
g(x)− ε ≤ g˜X(x) ≤ g(x). (2)
Further, by construction all elements v ∈ X satisfy
g(v) = R≥i(v). (3)
The set X now has at most 2k points. For any x ≤ r≥i, we let x (resp. x) denote the largest
(resp. smallest) value in X that is at most (at least) x. With this notation, if x = λxx+(1−λx)x,
then we have that
g˜X(x) = λxg˜X(x) + (1− λx)g˜X(x) = λxg(x) + (1− λx)g(x). (4)
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We are now ready to define a mechanism M ′ with high revenue and low i-deadline menu
complexity. The mechanism M ′ is defined as follows:
• Mimic M on days 1, 2, · · · , i− 1.
• On day i, if pj has mass f(pj), add mass f(pj)λpj to pj and mass f(pj)(1 − λpj ) to pj .
This generates a new distribution f ′ on X which defines our menu for day i.
• Do the optimal pricing days i+ 1 onwards given the prices on day 1 through i.
Since the menu offered on day i is defined by a distribution over X, it’s size is at most 2k,
the size of X. We finish the proof by showing that M ′ is feasible and has high revenue.
Claim C.1. The mechanism M ′ defined above is feasible.
Proof. We only need to check the intra-day incentive compatibility constraints. For days 1
through i− 1, M ′ mimics M and thus, these constraints are satisfied. Days i+ 1 onwards, M ′
prices optimally and thus, satisfies the constraints. We only argue about the constraints for day
i. We wish to prove that the utility of any bidder with type (x, i) in mechanism M ′ is at least
that of the bidder with type (x, i− 1). We know that the utility of any bidder with type (x, i) in
mechanism M is at least that of the bidder with type (x, i− 1). Since the mechanisms M and
M ′ are the same on days 1 through i− 1, it is sufficient to prove that the utility of any bidder
with type (x, i) in mechanism M ′ is at least that of the bidder with type (x, i) in mechanism M .
This follows directly from the expression of utilitiy
∑
pj≤x f(pj)(x− pj). We have
∑
X3v≤x
f ′(v)(x− v)
=
∑
pj≤x
f(pj)λpj (x− pj) + f(pj)(1− λpj )(x− pj) +
∑
pj∈(x,x]
f(pj)λpj (x− pj) (Definition of f ′)
=
∑
pj≤x
f(pj)(x− pj) +
∑
pj∈(x,x]
f(pj)
(
1−
pj − pj
pj − pj
)
(x− pj) (Definition of λpj )
≥
∑
pj≤x
f(pj)(x− pj) +
∑
pj∈(x,x]
f(pj)
(
1−
pj − pj
x− pj
)
(x− pj) (Since pj > x)
=
∑
pj≤x
f(pj)(x− pj) +
∑
pj∈(x,x]
f(pj)(x− pj) =
∑
pj≤x
f(pj)(x− pj).
Claim C.2. The revenue generated by M ′ is at least OPTM,i − ε.
Proof. First, we note M and M ′ are identical for the first i−1 days. Thus, the revenue generated
on the first i − 1 days is the same for both M and M ′. Since M ′ prices optimally day i + 1
onwards, the revenue generated on day i through n is
∑
v∈X f
′(v)R≥i(v). We have∑
v∈X
f ′(v)R≥i(v) =
∑
v∈X
f ′(v)g(v) (Equation 3)
=
∑
vj
f(vj)λvjg(vj) + f(vj)(1− λvj )g(vj) (Definition of f ′)
=
∑
vj
f(vj)g˜X(vj) (Equation 4)
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≥
∑
vj
f(vj) (g(vj)− ε) (Equation 2)
≥
∑
vj
f(vj)R≥i(vj)− ε.
This analysis proves that the total revenue generated by M ′ is at most ε less than that
generated by M . In other words, it is at least OPTM,i − ε.
These two claims combined suffice to prove the proposition.
Having described the construction of low i-deadline menu complexity mechanisms, we repeat
this construction n times (once for each deadline) to get our approximately optimal mechanism.
We also show how to use Proposition C.7 to go from the optimal mechanism to an entire menu
of low menu complexity. Thus, the total revenue loss on days i through n is at most ε. Using
the above result, we prove Corollary 4.1.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. We prove that for all i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}, there exists a mechanism with
j-deadline menu complexity of kj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i whose revenue is at least OPT−
∑i
j=1 εj . For
i = n, this is the same as the statement of the corollary. This proof will proceed via induction
on i. For i = 0, the statement is trivial. We assume the statement for i− 1 and prove it for i.
Let Mi−1 be the mechanism that is promised by the induction hypothesis and let Revi−1 ≥
OPT−∑i−1j=1 εi be its revenue.
We invoke Proposition C.7 on Xi and Mi−1 to get a mechanism Mi with the following
properties:
• The menu offered by Mi on days 1, 2, · · · , i− 1 is the same as Mi−1.
• The i-deadline menu complexity is at most 2ki.
• The revenue is at least OPTMi−1,i − εi.
Property 1 and 2 imply that the j-deadline menu complexity of Mi is at most kj for all
1 ≤ j ≤ i. The revenue of Mi is at least OPTMi−1,i − εi ≥ Revi−1 − εi ≥ OPT−
∑i−1
j=1 εj − εi =
OPT−∑ij=1 εj . This completes the proof.
Finally, we may complete the proof of Theorem 1.2.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. For any FedEx instance where the bidder’s types have integral support
1, 2, · · · , vmax, observe that the optimal revenue is at least 1. This is because 1 is the revenue
generated by the auction that offers the price 1 on all deadlines. Further, for all deadlines i,
1 + R˜≥i(vmax) ≤ OPT + OPT = 2OPT.
Note that all revenue curves R˜≥i = gi when restricted to [0, r≥i] satisfy the require-
ments of Theorem 4.2. This implies that for all i, there exists sequences Xi of at most
O
(
min
{
n/ε,
√
n
ε log vmax
})
points such that for all x ∈ [0, r≥i],
gi(x)− ε
2n
(1 + gi(vmax)) ≤ g˜iXi(x) ≤ gi(x).
We set εi =
ε
2n (1 + gi(vmax)) and use Corollary 4.1 to get that there exists a mechanism
with menu complexity at most O
(
nmin
{
n/ε,
√
n
ε log vmax
})
whose revenue is at least OPT−∑n
i=1 εi = OPT−
∑n
i=1
ε
2n (1 + gi(vmax)) ≥ OPT−
∑n
i=1 ε
OPT
n = (1− ε)OPT.
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D Analysis omitted in Section 5
D.1 The instance
In this section, we describe our instance of the FedEx problem that is hard to approximate
using small menus. Before delving into the details of our parameters, we give a brief high level
intuition.
In Section 4.1, we described a function LPLk that is hard to polygon approximate. The
function LPLk provided a lower bound for Theorem 4.2 that was tight (modulo constant factors).
The idea behind this example was to have a piecewise linear function such that the slope of the
constituent segments decreases gradually in a controlled way. Because of the intimate connection
between polygon approximation and menu complexity (Proposition C.7), similar ideas should
also help in constructing a FedEx instance that is hard to approximate using small menus.
The construction of the hard FedEx instance can be expected to have many additional compli-
cations. The complications arise from the fact that each revenue curve R≥i in a FedEx instance
is formed by appropriately adding revenue curves of multiple distributions (see Definition 2.3)
and R˜≥i is obtained by ‘ironing’ R≥i. Since the size of the optimal menu only increases when
prices ‘split’ across ironed intervals, it is necessary to have multiple (polynomial, in our case)
ironed intervals in the function R˜≥i.
The presence of multiple ironed intervals in R˜≥i is, however, not sufficient. It is easy to
see why. Imagine an example where all the revenue curves Ri are generated from the same
underlying distribution. If this is the case, all the curves R≥i might have the same ironed
intervals.12 If the ironed intervals in the curves R˜≥i for all i correspond, then even the optimal
revenue auction would require only 1 price on each day. This is because only those prices ‘split’
that are inside an ironed interval. If all the ironed intervals correspond, then no price can ever
lie inside a interval. The solution is to have ironed intervals ‘nested’ so that the ends of the
interval on day i lie inside the intervals on day i+ 1.
The two points raised above concern splitting in general and were also true of our worst
case example described in Section 3. If we want a lower bound for all approximate auctions, we
also want the slope between two consecutive segments to be very different (as in LPLk). This
ensures that we need at least one menu option for each segment for a good approximation.
With these ideas in mind, we describe our hard instance. We assume that the bidder’s type
is drawn from a distribution supported on {1, 2, · · · , vmax} × {1, 2, · · · , n}. The value of vmax in
our example is 5n and the distribution q over days is uniform. We make explicit that we don’t
include the q in our calculation. Since they only scale all revenue curves by 1/n, they don’t
affect the quality of a 1−  approximation. The marginal distribution Fi on day i is designed so
that the revenue curve R˜≥i has i+ 1 segments. The slope of the first i segments is geometrically
decreasing with common ratio λ = 1 + 14n . This value is large enough so that a 1 − O(1/n2)
approximation will require one menu option for each segment. It also satisfies,
Claim D.1. For n ≥ i ≥ 0, 1
λi
> 34 .
Proof.
3
4
λi <
3
4
(
1 +
1
4n
)n ≤ 3
4
e
1
4 < 1.
As we define the slopes to be in geometric progression, the geometric sum 1 + 1λ · · · will
appear multiple times in our description and its analysis. To avoid writing the all the terms
everywhere, we define S0 = n and Si = n+
∑i−1
j=0 λ
−j for all i ≥ 1.
12This is not always true as whether a particular interval is ironed or not for a given deadline depends on many
other factors, e.g. the distribution qi across the various days.
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The (i+ 1)th segment of R˜≥i will have slope (n+ 1− i)C where C = 1/2. This last segment
will split into two segments on day i+ 1. The first segment will have slope 1/λi, continuing the
geometric progression. The last segment will have slope (n− i)C, allowing it to be split similarly
in the future. In order to ensure this behavior of R˜≥i, we need the slope of Ri to be βi for this
segment, where
βi =
1
3n+ i
(
3n− i
2
− n− i
λi
+ Si
)
. (5)
This value of βi satisfies the following two properties:
Claim D.2. βi is an increasing sequence for n ≥ i ≥ 0.
Proof. Fix n > i ≥ 0.
βi+1 − βi
=
1
3n+ i+ 1
(
3n− i− 1
2
− n− i− 1
λi+1
+ Si+1
)
− 1
3n+ i
(
3n− i
2
− n− i
λi
+ Si
)
(Equation 5)
=
1
(3n+ i)(3n+ i+ 1)
(
−3n+ (λ− 1)(3n+ i+ 1)(n− i)
λi+1
+
4n
λi+1
+
3n+ i
λi
− Si
)
≥ 1
(3n+ i)(3n+ i+ 1)
(
3(3n+ i+ 1)(n− i)
16n
+
3(3n+ i)
4
− Si
)
(Claim D.1)
≥ 1
(3n+ i)(3n+ i+ 1)
(
9n
4
− 2n
)
> 0.
Claim D.3. For n ≥ i ≥ 1, 12 < β1 = 12 + 54λ(3n+1) ≤ βi ≤ 34 .
Proof. Verify that β1 is indeed correct. After proving Claim D.2, it is sufficient to establish
βn ≤ 34 .
βn =
1
4n
(n+ Sn) ≤ 3n
4n
.
We now define the marginal distribution Fi on the i
th deadline. We write a expression for
the distribution and then, calculate the revenue curve Ri of the distribution Fi. The part of the
analysis where we prove that Fi is a valid distribution is omitted. This would use
Si
n+i ≥ Si+1n+i+1
and βi ≤ Sin+i (where Claim D.1 and Claim D.3 help prove the latter) and can easily be done by
the interested reader. The distribution over types on the ith day is given by :
Fi(x) =

0, 0 ≤ x ≤ n(
1− S1n+1
)
, n ≤ x ≤ n+ 1(
1− S2n+2
)
, n+ 1 ≤ x ≤ n+ 2(
1− S3n+3
)
, n+ 2 ≤ x ≤ n+ 3
...(
1− Sin+i
)
, n+ i− 1 ≤ x ≤ n+ i
(1− βi), n+ i ≤ x ≤ 3n+ i
1, 3n+ i ≤ x ≤ 5n.
(6)
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The revenue curve for this distribution is given by Ri(v) = v (1− Fi(v)):
Ri(x) =

x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n(
S1
n+1
)
x, n < x ≤ n+ 1(
S2
n+2
)
x, n+ 1 < x ≤ n+ 2(
S3
n+3
)
x, n+ 2 < x ≤ n+ 3
...(
Si
n+i
)
x, n+ i− 1 < x ≤ n+ i
βix, n+ i < x ≤ 3n+ i
0, 3n+ i < x ≤ 5n.
(7)
Using Definition 2.3, we now calculate the combined revenue curve R≥i for days i through n.
We prove that R≥i has the form we desire using induction.
Theorem D.1.
R≥i(x) =

x+ (n− i)x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n(
S1
n+1
)
x+ (n− i) (x− n+ S0) , n < x ≤ n+ 1(
S2
n+2
)
x+ (n− i) (x−n−1λ + S1) , n+ 1 < x ≤ n+ 2(
S3
n+3
)
x+ (n− i) (x−n−2
λ2
+ S2
)
, n+ 2 < x ≤ n+ 3
...(
Si
n+i
)
x+ (n− i) (x+1−n−i
λi−1 + Si−1
)
, n+ i− 1 < x ≤ n+ i
βix+ (n− i)
(
x−n−i
λi
+ Si
)
, n+ i < x ≤ n+ i+ 1
βix+ (n− i) (C(x− n− i− 1) + Si+1) , n+ i+ 1 < x ≤ 3n+ i
(n− i) (C(x− n− i− 1) + Si+1) , 3n+ i < x ≤ 3n+ i+ 1
(n− i) (2nC + Si+1) , 3n+ i+ 1 < x ≤ 5n.
(8)
Proof. Proof by backwards induction. The base case i = n is easily verified. For the inductive
step, we first calculate R˜≥i. This is done by ironing the curve R≥i defined in Equation 8. We
provide an expression for R˜≥i and prove that it is correct in Lemma D.4 in Subsection D.2 of
this Appendix. The expression is:
R˜≥i(x) =

(n+ 1− i)x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n
(n+ 1− i)(x− n+ S0), n < x ≤ n+ 1
(n+ 1− i) (x−n−1λ + S1) , n+ 1 < x ≤ n+ 2
(n+ 1− i) (x−n−2
λ2
+ S2
)
, n+ 2 < x ≤ n+ 3
...
(n+ 1− i) (x+1−n−i
λi−1 + Si−1
)
, n+ i− 1 < x ≤ n+ i
(n+ 1− i) (C(x− n− i) + Si) , n+ i < x ≤ 3n+ i
(n− i) (2nC + Si+1) + (n−i)C−βi(3n+i)2n−i (x− 5n), 3n+ i < x ≤ 5n.
(9)
Note that this function is maximized at r≥i = 3n+ i. We now use Definition 2.3 which says:
R≥i−1(v) =
{
Ri−1(v) + R˜≥i(v), v < r≥i
Ri−1(v) + R˜≥i(r≥i), v ≥ r≥i.
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Using Equation 7 and Equation 9 in this gives:
R≥i−1(x) =

x+ (n+ 1− i)x, 0 ≤ x ≤ n(
S1
n+1
)
x+ (n+ 1− i)(x− n+ S0), n < x ≤ n+ 1(
S2
n+2
)
x+ (n+ 1− i) (x−n−1λ + S1) , n+ 1 < x ≤ n+ 2(
S3
n+3
)
x+ (n+ 1− i) (x−n−2
λ2
+ S2
)
, n+ 2 < x ≤ n+ 3
...(
Si−1
n+i−1
)
x+ (n+ 1− i) (x+2−n−i
λi−2 + Si−2
)
, n+ i− 2 < x ≤ n+ i− 1
βi−1x+ (n+ 1− i)
(
x+1−n−i
λi−1 + Si−1
)
, n+ i− 1 < x ≤ n+ i
βi−1x+ (n+ 1− i) (C(x− n− i) + Si) , n+ i < x ≤ 3n+ i− 1
(n+ 1− i) (C(x− n− i) + Si) , 3n+ i− 1 < x ≤ 3n+ i
(n+ 1− i) (2nC + Si) , 3n+ i < x ≤ 5n.
which is of the form required by the induction hypothesis.
It is relatively easy to find the optimal auction in our instance using Fiat et al.’s algorithm
[FGKK16]. The optimal auction closely follows the behavior of the curves R˜≥i. It has one menu
option = 3n+ 1 on day 1. On each subsequent day, the last menu option splits into two options
while all the other options are carried as is. For example, the price 3n+ 1 splits into two prices
of n+ 2 and 3n+ 2 on day 2. The price n+ 2 is pushed forward to all of the days while the
price 3n+ 2 is split into n+ 3 and 3n+ 3. The price n+ 3 is pushed through while the price
3n+ 3 is again spit into two on day 4. This process goes on till the nth day. The menu offered
on day n has options n+ 2, n+ 3, · · · , n+ n and 4n.
Remark D.1. The optimal revenue in the setting described is at most maxR≥1 = n(2n + 1)
which is between 2n2 and 3n2. This is denoted by OPT throughout.
D.2 Omitted details from the proof of Theorem D.1
In this subsection we show that R˜≥i(x) is the upper concave envelope of R≥i(x), where both
functions are as defined in Appendix D. The proof consists of showing that the two functions
agree on the points where R˜≥i(x) changes, and that R˜≥i(x) is greater than R≥i(x) on the other
points. This, combined with the fact that R˜≥i(x) is linear in between the points where it changes,
suffices to show the claim.
Lemma D.2. For all x ∈ {0, n, n+ 1, n+ 2, · · · , n+ i− 1, n+ i, 3n+ i, 5n}, we have R˜≥i(x) =
R≥i(x).
Proof. We prove this lemma using four claims, all of which establish R˜≥i(x) = R≥i(x) for
different domains of x.
Claim D.4. For all x ∈ {0, n}, we have R˜≥i(x) = R≥i(x).
Proof. By verification: x+ (n− i)x = (n+ 1− i)x.
Claim D.5. For all x ∈ {n+ 1, n+ 2, · · · , n+ i− 1, n+ i}, we have R˜≥i(x) = R≥i(x).
Proof. By verification:
R˜≥i(x)−R≥i(x) =
(
1
λx−n−1
+ Sx−n−1
)
− Sx−n = 0.
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Claim D.6. R˜≥i(3n+ i) = R≥i(3n+ i).
Proof.
R≥i(3n+ i) = βi(3n+ i) + (n− i) (C(2n− 1) + Si+1)
=
(
3n− i
2
− n− i
λi
+ Si
)
+ (n− i) (C(2n− 1) + Si+1) (Equation 5)
= n+
(
(n− i)C − n− i
λi
+ Si
)
+ (n− i) (C(2n− 1) + Si+1)
= n+ Si + (n− i) (2nC + Si)
= (n+ 1− i) (2nC + Si) = R˜≥i(3n+ i).
Claim D.7. R˜≥i(5n) = R≥i(5n).
Proof. This is easily verifiable from the description of the functions.
Lemma D.3. For all 0 ≤ x ≤ 5n, we have R˜≥i(x) ≥ R≥i(x).
Proof. Note that both functions are piecewise linear. The function R˜≥i changes form at points
S1 = {0, n, n + 1, n + 2, · · · , n + i − 1, n + i, 3n + i, 5n}. The function R≥i changes form at
points in S2 = S1 ∪ {n+ i+ 1, 3n+ i+ 1}. To prove this lemma, it is sufficient to show that
R˜≥i(x) ≥ R≥i(x) for all x ∈ S2. If x ∈ S1, this follows by Lemma D.2. We only prove for
x ∈ {n+ i+ 1, 3n+ i+ 1}.
If x = n+ i+ 1, we get
R˜≥i(n+ i+ 1)−R≥i(n+ i+ 1)
= (n+ 1− i) (C + Si)− βi(n+ i+ 1)− (n− i)
(
1
λi
+ Si
)
= C + Si + (n− i)
(
C − 1
λi
)
− βi(n+ i+ 1)
= C + βi(3n+ i)− 2nC − βi(n+ i+ 1) (Equation 5)
= (βi − C)(2n− 1)
> 0. (D.3)
If x = 3n+ i+ 1, we get
R˜≥i(3n+ i+ 1) ≥ (n− i) (2nC + Si+1) = R≥i(3n+ i+ 1),
as the other term in the definition of R˜≥i is positive.
Lemma D.4. The upper concave envelope of the function R≥i defined in Equation 8 is the
function R˜≥i defined in Equation 9.
Proof. By definition, R˜≥i is a continuous piecewise linear function whose successive segments
have decreasing slope. Thus, it is concave. Lemma D.3 shows that the function R˜≥i is always
larger that R≥i. Note that the function R˜≥i is piecewise linear and changes form at points
0, n, n+ 1, n+ 2, · · · , n+ i− 1, n+ i, 3n+ i, and 5n. Lemma D.2 shows that at all these points,
the value of R˜≥i is that same as that of R≥i. This finishes the proof.
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D.3 Cleaning
We start by fixing notation that we employ in this subsection. The letters R, R˜, q, and F are
reserved for the revenue curves and the type distribution of our FedEx instance. These are
described in Equation 8, Equation 9, and Equation 6 respectively (q is assumed to be uniform and
is omitted throughout). The letters A and B would denote the allocation curves of mechanisms,
i.e., the allocation curve on day i would be denoted by Ai or Bi. Thus, for x ∈ [0, vmax], a bidder
that reports type (x, i) gets the item with probability Ai(x). We assume without loss of generality
that Ai(0) = 0 and Ai(vmax) = 1. In line with the notation used for probability distributions, we
reserve the lower case ai for the ‘allocation density’, i.e., ai(x) = Ai(x)−Ai(x− 1). With this
notation, the menu complexity of a mechanism MA is the number of (x, i) such that ai(x) 6= 0.
Unless specified otherwise, all statements about clean mechanisms pertain our particular instance
of the FedEx problem defined in the previous section.
In the FedEx problem, menus on day i are constrained by the menu offered on day i − 1.
These constraints are represented by the downwards IC constraints in Equation 1. In this sense,
some menus on day i − 1 are strictly more constraining than others. For example, a price of
p1 is offered on day i− 1 is strictly more constraining than a price of p2 > p1. This is because
the utility pi(v, i− 1)v − p(v, i− 1) is strictly higher. Similarly, a distribution over two prices of
p1 and p2 with probabilities q and 1− q respectively is strictly more constraining than offering
the single price p = qp1 + (1− q)p2. This reasoning also applies in case the price p has a small
mass in a larger distribution. In the case a feasible less constraining menu generates a higher
revenue on a particular day than a more constraining one, the latter can be changed to the
former without violating any of the feasibility constraints. This change will only increase the
revenue generated.
In the problem instance we consider, the revenue curve Ri for a given day i is increasing and
touches the upper concave envelope at all points in Z∩ [0, n+ i]. Thus, if a price p in this range is
offered with probability f(p) on day i− 1, the least constraining and revenue maximizing option
on day i is to offer the same price with the same probability. We define ‘clean’ mechanisms to
be mechanisms that satisfy this property. Formally,
Definition D.1 (Clean mechanisms). Let ai be the allocation density for day i of a mechanism
M . The mechanism M is said to be clean if for all days i ≥ 1 and any point 0 ≤ x ≤ n+ i, we
have
ai+1(x) ≥ ai(x).
The reason we do not require equality in the expression above is that the (allocation) mass
from points higher than n+ i may be moved to lower points causing an increase in the value of
ai(·) there. We prove in Theorem D.8 that an arbitrary mechanism can be converted to a clean
mechanism that is ‘intimately’ connected to the original mechanism. We state a direct corollary
here that is obtained by setting k = n and xi = n+ i for all i in the statement of the theorem.
Corollary D.5 (Cleaning). Consider any mechanism MA for the FedEx instance described in
subsection D.1. There exists a mechanism MB such that:
• MB mimics MA on day 1.
• MB is clean.
• For all days i, we have Bi  Ai.
• For all days i, ∑vmaxj=0 Ri(j)bi(j) ≥∑vmaxj=0 Ri(j)ai(j).
Here,  denotes stochastic dominance of the second-order.
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D.4 The statement and proof of Theorem D.8 13
Consider any mechanism M . Let Ai(v) : {0, 1, · · · , V } → [0, 1] denote the allocation function of
mechanism M on day i. We know from the IC constraints that Ai(v) is monotone non-decreasing
for all i. Without loss of generality, assume that Ai(V ) = 1. We interpret Ai as the cumulative
distribution function of some random variable. The leftwards IC constraints say that for all
i > 1, v ≤ V , we have,
v∑
j=0
Ai(j) ≥
v∑
j=0
Ai−1(j). (10)
We define stochastic dominance and state a well-known result
Definition D.2. Consider two discrete random variables X and Y supported on the non-negative
integers. (F , G are the cdfs of the random variables). We say X has (second-order) stochastic
dominance over Y if and only if for all x ∈ Z,
x∑
j=0
F (j) ≤
x∑
j=0
G(j).
We denote this by X  Y .
We have the following well-known result on necessary and sufficient conditions for second-order
stochastic dominance:
Theorem D.6. Let XA and XB be two random variables with distributions A and B respectively.
The following statements are equivalent:
• XA  XB.
• There exist random variables Y and Z such that XB d= XA + Y + Z, with Y always at
most 0 and Z such that E[Z | XA + Y ] = 0.
• For any concave and increasing function f , it holds that ∑Vj=0 f(j)a(j) ≥∑Vj=0 f(j)b(j).
Here,
d
= denotes equivalence in distribution.
We proceed to prove our main technical lemma.
Lemma D.7. If any two random variables A and C defined on [0, V ]∩Z satisfy A  C, then for
any x, there exists a B such that A  B  C and for all v ≤ x, we have Pr(B = v) ≥ Pr(A = v).
Furthermore, if f is a function that is increasing on [0, x] such that f(j) = f˜(j) for all
0 ≤ j ≤ x, then ∑Vj=0 f(j) Pr(B = j) ≥∑Vj=0 f(j) Pr(C = j).
Proof. Theorem D.6 promises random variables Y and Z such that C
d
= A+Y +Z, where Y ≤ 0
and E[Z | A+ Y ] = 0. Our goal is to construct a random variable B such that A  B  C. We
wish to establish both the stochastic dominance results via Theorem D.6. To this end, we first
construct random variables Y1 and Z1 and use these to define B. Let
Y1 =
{
0, if A < x
max(Y, x−A), if A ≥ x. (11)
13Auxiliary results that can be skipped without loss of comprehension.
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Note that Y1 ≤ 0. Next, define Z1
Z1 =
{
Z, if x−A < Y1
0, if x−A ≥ Y1.
(12)
We prove that E[Z1 | A+ Y1] = 0 in D.9 paving the way for Theorem D.6. For that, we need
another result.
Claim D.8. For any k > x, the event A+ Y1 = k happens if and only if A+ Y = k.
Proof. First, assume A + Y1 = k > x. This means that A ≥ A + Y1 = k > x and hence, by
Equation 11, Y1 = max(Y, x−A). However, Y1 > x−A implying that Y1 = Y .
Second, assume that A + Y = k. Again, we have A ≥ A + Y = k > x and hence, by
Equation 11, Y1 = max(Y, x−A) = Y .
Claim D.9. E[Z1 | A+ Y1] = 0.
Proof. Fix A+ Y1 = k where k is arbitrary. If k ≤ x, then Z1 = 0 and the claim follows.
If, on the other hand, k > x, then D.8 applies. Thus, by Equation 12, we have
E[Z1 | A+ Y1 = k] = E[Z | A+ Y = k] = 0.
Define B = A+ Y1 + Z1. Then, D.9 means that A  B. Now, we wish to prove that B  C.
Our strategy is to again employ Theorem D.6. For this, we define Y2 and Z2.
Y2 = Y − Y1. (13)
Note that
Claim D.10. Y2 ≤ 0.
Proof. We prove that Y ≤ Y1. If A < x, the Y1 = 0 and this is trivial. Otherwise, Y1 =
max(Y, x−A) ≥ Y .
We next define Z2 as
Z2 = Z − Z1. (14)
Claim D.11. E[Z2 | B + Y2] = 0.
Proof. Fix B + Y2 = k where k is arbitrary. Since B = A+ Y1 + Z1, this is equivalent to saying
that A+ Y + Z1 = k.
We prove that E[Z2 | B + Y2] = 0 by arguing E[Z2 | B + Y2, x − A < Y1] = 0 and
E[Z2 | B + Y2, x − A ≥ Y1] = 0. We first deal with the former. If x − A < Y1, then Z1 = Z
(Equation 12) and hence Z2 = 0 and we are done.
Now, suppose x−A ≥ Y1. In this case, Z1 = 0 (Equation 12) and hence B + Y2 = k if and
only if A+ Y = k.
E[Z2 | B + Y2 = k, x−A ≥ Y1] = E[Z | A+ Y = k, x−A ≥ Y1].
Note that x−A ≥ Y1 is the same as x ≥ A+ Y1 which happens if and only if x ≥ A+ Y = k
(D.8). Thus,
E[Z | A+ Y = k, x−A ≥ Y1] = E[Z | A+ Y = k, x ≥ k] = 0.
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Since B+Y2 +Z2 = A+Y1 +Z1 +Y2 +Z2 = A+Y +Z = C by Equation 13 and Equation 14,
we have that B  C by D.10 and D.11.
Consider the event A = v for v < x. Since v ≤ x, both Y1 and Z1 are 0. Thus, B = v. Hence,
Pr(B = v) ≥ Pr(A = v).
Finally, consider a function f such that f(j) = f˜(j) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ x. We wish to prove that∑V
j=0 f(j) Pr(C = j) ≤
∑V
j=0 f(j) Pr(B = j). We break the proof into 2 cases. Each one of the
following claims handles one such case.
Claim D.12. Let E1 be the event A + Y > x. We have
∑V
j=0 f(j) Pr(C = j | E1) ≤∑V
j=0 f(j) Pr(B = j | E1)
Proof. By D.8, E1 can equivalently be described as A + Y1 > x. We use these two forms
interchangeably in this proof. If E1 occurs, Y1 = Y and Z1 = Z (Equation 11 and Equation 12).
Thus, B = C and the claim follows.
Claim D.13. Let E2 be the event A + Y ≤ x. We have
∑V
j=0 f(j) Pr(C = j | E2) ≤∑V
j=0 f(j) Pr(B = j | E2)
Proof. By D.8, E2 can equivalently be described as A + Y1 ≤ x. We use these two forms
interchangeably in this proof. If E2 occurs, Z1 = 0 (Equation 12). Thus, B = A+Y1+Z1 = A+Y1
implying x ≥ B ≥ A+ Y . Thus, for all j1 ≤ x, we have
V∑
j=0
f(j) Pr(B = j | A+ Y = j1) =
x∑
j=j1
f(j) Pr(B = j | A+ Y = j1) ≥ f(j1).
We have
V∑
j=0
f(j) Pr(C = j | E2) ≤
V∑
j=0
f˜(j) Pr(C = j | E2)
≤
x∑
j1=0
Pr(A+ Y = j1 | E2)
V∑
j=0
f˜(j) Pr(C = j | A+ Y = j1)
≤
x∑
j1=0
Pr(A+ Y = j1 | E2)f˜
 V∑
j=0
j Pr(C = j | A+ Y = j1)

=
x∑
j1=0
Pr(A+ Y = j1 | E2)f˜ (j1)
≤
x∑
j1=0
Pr(A+ Y = j1 | E2)
V∑
j=0
f˜ (j) Pr(B = j | A+ Y = j1)
If A+ Y = j1 ≤ x, we have B ∈ [j1, x] and hence,
V∑
j=0
f(j) Pr(C = j | E2) ≤
x∑
j1=0
Pr(A+ Y = j1 | E2)
V∑
j=0
f˜ (j) Pr(B = j | A+ Y = j1)
=
x∑
j1=0
Pr(A+ Y = j1 | E2)
V∑
j=0
f (j) Pr(B = j | A+ Y = j1)
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=V∑
j=0
f (j) Pr(B = j | E2)
We are now ready to prove our main “cleaning” result:
Theorem D.8 (Cleaning). Consider any mechanism MA for any FedEx instance with type
space [0, V ]× {1, 2, · · ·n}. Let {xi}n−1i=1 be a sequence of numbers in [0, V ]. For any k ≥ 1, there
exists a mechanism MB such that:
• MB mimics MA on day 1.
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and v ≤ xi,we have bi+1(v) ≥ bi(v).
• For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we have Bi  Ai and for all i > k we have Bi = Ai.
• For all 1 < i ≤ k, if the revenue curve Ri on day i of the bidder is increasing on [0, xi−1]
such that Ri(j) = R˜i(j) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ xi−1, then
∑V
j=0Ri(j)bi(j) ≥
∑V
j=0Ri(j)ai(j).
If it were not for the last two bullets, Theorem D.8 would be trivial. We could have set MB
to be the optimal mechanism given the allocation of MA on day 1. That the optimal mechanism
is clean is an easy consequence of Fiat et al’s algorithm [FGKK16]. Intuitively, these bullets say
that the curves Ai can be obtained from Bi by ‘splitting’ and ‘lowering’ prices appropriately
and that these actions do not decrease the revenue generated. This structure ensures that we
can convert results for the mechanism MB into results for MA.
This is exactly how we proceed. We take an arbitrary auction and clean it. We prove that a
clean auction that generates high revenue must have a high menu complexity. We then translate
this into a result for the original auction.
Proof of Theorem D.8. Proof by induction on k. If k = 1, we set MB = MA and observe that
all the conditions are satisfied. We assume the result holds for k − 1 and prove it for k > 1. Let
MC be the mechanism promised by the induction hypothesis. Since MC is feasible, we have
Ck−1  Ck.
Applying Lemma D.7 on Ck−1, Ck = Ak and xk−1 , we get Bk such that
Ck−1  Bk  Ak, (15)
and for all v ≤ xk−1, we have bk(v) ≥ ck−1(v). Furthermore, if f is a function that is increasing
on [0, xk−1] such that f(j) = f˜(j) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ xk−1, then
∑V
j=0 f(j)bk(j) ≥
∑V
j=0 f(j)ak(j).
Define the mechanism MB to be MC with the allocation Ck on day k replaced by Bk. Equation 15
implies that MB is feasible.
Observe that MB satisfies all requirements.
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D.5 Analysis of clean auctions
If fi is the marginal density of bidder types on day i, then the revenue generated by the
allocation density ai is equal to
∑vmax
x=0 fi(x)pi(x) where pi(x) is the payment made by the
bidder that reports type (x, i). Due to Myerson’s payment identity [Mye81], we know that
pi(x) =
∑x
j=0 jai(j). Using this expression, the revenue generated by the allocation density ai
on day i is equal to
vmax∑
x=0
fi(x)pi(x) =
vmax∑
x=0
x∑
j=0
jai(j)fi(x)
=
vmax∑
j=0
jai(j)(1− F (j − 1)) =
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)Ri(j).
We will use this expression frequently. Lemma 2.1 says that given the allocation density
ai, the revenue generated by the optimal mechanism on days i through n is
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R≥i(j).
Of this revenue, an amount equal to
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)Ri(j) is generated on day i and the remainder∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R≥i(j)−
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)Ri(j) is generated on days i+ 1 and onwards. By 2.3, this is
equal to
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)).
D.5.1 Analyzing clean auctions
We described the optimal auction for our instance. It has the i − 1 menu options n + 2, n +
3, · · · , n+ i− 1 and 3n+ i− 1 on day i− 1. On day i, the menu option 3n+ i− 1 is split into
n+ i and 3n+ i while all the others are carried over. The first lemma we prove tries to formalize
that this split is necessary. We intend to use this lemma in our analysis of clean auctions. By
definition, a clean auction carries all prices in the range [0, n+ i− 1] on day i− 1 over to day i.
We prove that if a price between n+ i and 3n+ i− 1/2 is split without creating a new menu
option of n+ i, a significant revenue loss is incurred. This loss is the difference between what is
actually obtained and what what could have been obtained.
If a price of x < 3n+ i is set on day i− 1, then the maximum revenue that can be generated
day i onwards is R˜≥i(x). The revenue generated by an allocation ai is at most
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R≥i(j).
We prove that if an allocation is feasible (this translates to
∑vmax
j=0 jai(j) ≤ x) but ai(n+ i) = 0,
then the difference between the two terms above is large.
Lemma D.9. Fix any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n+ i ≤ x ≤ 3n+ i− 1/2. For any allocation density ai,
if ai(n+ i) = 0 and
∑vmax
j=0 jai(j) ≤ x, it holds that
R˜≥i(x)−
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j) ≥ n+ 1− i
10(2n+ 1)
.
Proof. Consider the line joining the points (n+ i− 1, R˜≥i(n+ i− 1)) and (3n+ i, R˜≥i(3n+ i)).
Any point on this line satisfies y = `(x) for a linear function `. Define the function S(x) =
min(`(x), R˜≥i(x)). The function S is the minimum of two concave functions and hence is concave.
Further, S(x) ≥ R≥i(x) on all points x ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , 5n} \ {n + i}.14 Using these facts and
Jensen’s inequality,
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j) ≤
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)S(j) ≤ S
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)j
 .
14This can be verified by the interested reader. We omit the calculations.
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We observe that the function S is increasing below 3n+ i. Thus,
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j) ≤ S
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)j
 ≤ S(x).
By direct calculation, we have that
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j) ≤ S(x) ≤ `(x)
=
3n+ i− x
2n+ 1
R˜≥i(n+ i− 1) + x+ 1− n− i
2n+ 1
R˜≥i(3n+ i)
=
3n+ i− x
2n+ 1
(n+ 1− i)Si−1 + x+ 1− n− i
2n+ 1
(n+ 1− i)(n+ Si) (Equation 9)
= (n+ 1− i)
(
C(x− n− i) + Si + 3n+ i− x
2n+ 1
(
1
2
− 1
λi−1
))
.
We also have that
R˜≥i(x) = (n+ 1− i) (C(x− n− i) + Si) . (Equation 9)
Combining,
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j) ≤ R˜≥i(x)− n+ 1− i
2n+ 1
(3n+ i− x)
(
1
λi−1
− 1
2
)
≤ R˜≥i(x)− n+ 1− i
2(2n+ 1)
(
1
λi−1
− 1
2
)
< R˜≥i(x)− n+ 1− i
10(2n+ 1)
. (Claim D.1)
A corollary of the above result takes care of the case where ai(n+ i) 6= 0 but is small.
Corollary D.10. Fix any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and n+ i ≤ x ≤ 3n+ i− 3/4. For any allocation density
ai, if ai(n+ i) <
1
100n and
∑vmax
j=0 jai(j) ≤ x, it holds that
R˜≥i(x)−
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j) ≥ n+ 1− i
20(2n+ 1)
.
Proof. Construct the allocation
a′i(x) =
{
0, if x = n+ i
ai(x)
1−ai(n+i) , if x 6= n+ i.
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Note that:
(1− ai(n+ i))
vmax∑
j=0
ja′i(j)− (n+ i)
 = vmax∑
j=0
jai(j)− (n+ i). (16)
Set y = max
(∑vmax
j=0 ja
′
i(j), n+ i
)
≥ n+ i. Note that y ≤ 3n+ i− 1/2 because:
vmax∑
j=0
ja′i(j) =
1
1− ai(n+ i)
vmax∑
j=0
jai(j)− (n+ i)
+ (n+ i)
≤ 100n
100n− 1 (2n− 3/4) + (n+ i) ≤ 3n+ i− 1/2.
Thus, Lemma D.9 holds for y, a′i and we have
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j)−R≥i(n+ i)
= (1− ai(n+ i))
vmax∑
j=0
a′i(j)R≥i(j)−R≥i(n+ i)

≤ (1− ai(n+ i))
(
R˜≥i(y)−R≥i(n+ i)− n+ 1− i
10(2n+ 1)
)
(Lemma D.9)
= (1− ai(n+ i))
(
(n+ 1− i)C (y − (n+ i))− n+ 1− i
10(2n+ 1)
)
(Equation 9)
≤ (n+ 1− i)C (x− (n+ i))− (1− ai(n+ i)) n+ 1− i
10(2n+ 1)
(Equation 16)
= R˜≥i(x)−R≥i(n+ i)− (1− ai(n+ i)) n+ 1− i
10(2n+ 1)
. (Equation 9)
Adding R≥i(n+ i) to both sides, we get the result.
Corollary D.10 is our final result about the prices that split. These prices (in our instance)
are in the range [n + i, 3n + i] on day i. We next state results concerning prices outside this
range. First, we deal with points x > 3n+ i such that ai(x) > 0. The next pair of lemmas we
prove upper bound the ‘allocation mass’ on this tail.
Lemma D.11. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and x > 3n+ i, R≥i(3n+ i)−R≥i(x) ≥ n.
Proof. Proof by calculation.
R≥i(3n+ i)−R≥i(x) ≥ βi(3n+ i) + (n− i)(C(2n− 1) + Si)− (n− i)(2nC + Si) (Equation 8)
= βi(3n+ i)− (n− i)C
>
3n+ i
2
− n− i
2
(Claim D.3)
= n+ i > n.
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The next lemma shows that any approximately optimal mechanism for our instance must
allocate very little mass to the tail end of the distribution.
Lemma D.12. Consider any mechanism M for the FedEx instance described in Section D.1.
If M generates at least a 1 − 1
1000n2
fraction of the optimal revenue OPT, then on all days
1 ≤ i ≤ n, the allocation curve Ai of the mechanism M satisfies,
Ai(3n+ i) ≥ 1− 1
200n
.
Proof. The statement can be verified for i = 1 and so we assume i > 1. Consider the allocation
curve Ai−1 on the (i− 1)th deadline. Given Ai−1, the optimal revenue that can be generated on
days i through n is
∑vmax
j=0 ai−1(j)R˜≥i(min(j, 3n+ i)). Since Ai−1  Ai, we know by the third
bullet in Theorem D.6 that:
vmax∑
j=0
ai−1(j)R˜≥i(min(j, 3n+ i)) ≥
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R˜≥i(min(j, 3n+ i)).
The actual revenue generated on days i through n is at most
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R≥i(j). Thus,
allocating according to ai on day i incurs a revenue loss of at least
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R˜≥i(min(j, 3n+
i))−∑vmaxj=0 ai(j)R≥i(j) on days i through n. This is at least:
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R˜≥i(min(j, 3n+ i))−
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R≥i(j)
≥
vmax∑
j=3n+i+1
ai(j)
(
R˜≥i(3n+ i)−R≥i(j)
)
(As R˜≥i(j) ≥ R≥i(j))
≥ n
vmax∑
3n+i+1
ai(x)dx = n (1−Ai(3n+ i)) . (Lemma D.11)
For a 1− 1
1000n2
approximate auction, the loss in revenue is upper bounded by 1200 . Thus,
n (1−Ai(3n+ i)) ≤ 1200 implying Ai(3n+ i) ≥ 1− 1200n .
Finally, we prove some technical results for allocating in the range [0, n+ i].
Lemma D.13. For any clean mechanism M that generates revenue at least 99100 times OPT,
An/3(4n/3) ≤
1
2
.
Proof. The Myerson optimal revenue for day i is maxxRi(x) = βi(3n+ i) by Equation 7. We
upper bound the revenue generated by M on days 1 through n/3− 1 by ∑n/3−1i=1 βi(3n+ i). We
have
n/3−1∑
i=1
βi(3n+ i) =
n/3∑
i=1
3n− i
2
− n− i
λi
+ Si (Equation 5)
≤
n/3−1∑
i=1
3n− i
2
− 3(n− i)
4
+ n+ i (D.1)
≤
n/3−1∑
i=1
7n+ 5i
4
<
3n2
4
− 9n
4
.
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The revenue generated on day n/3 onwards is upper bounded by
∑vmax
j=0 an/3(j)R≥n/3(j). Sup-
pose for the sake of contradiction thatAn/3(4n/3) >
1
2 . If this is the case, then
∑vmax
j=0 an/3(j)R≥n/3(j)
is upper-bounded by
vmax∑
j=0
an/3(j)R≥n/3(j) ≤ An/3(4n/3)R≥n/3(4n/3) + (1−An/3(4n/3))R≥n/3(10n/3)
≤ R≥n/3(10n/3)−An/3(4n/3)
(
R≥n/3(10n/3)−R≥n/3(4n/3)
)
≤ 11n
2
9
+
11n
6
.
The sum of these two contributions is at most 3n
2
4 +
11n2
9 =
71n2
36 ≤ 7172OPT, a contradiction.
Lemma D.14. Let ai and ai+1 be allocations that satisfy
∑x
j=0Ai+1(j) ≥
∑x
j=0Ai(j) for all x.
Further, let vi, vi+1 be such that Ai(vi) = Ai+1(vi+1) = α. Then,
vi+1∑
j=0
jai+1(j) ≤
vi∑
j=0
jai(j).
Proof. First suppose that vi < vi+1. We have:
vi+1∑
j=0
jai+1(j)−
vi∑
j=0
jai(j) = α(vi+1 − vi)−
vi+1∑
j=0
Ai+1(j) +
vi∑
j=0
Ai(j)
≤ α(vi+1 − vi)−
vi+1∑
j=vi+1
Ai(j)
≤ α(vi+1 − vi)−
vi+1∑
j=vi+1
α = 0.
If vi ≥ vi+1. We have:
vi+1∑
j=0
jai+1(j)−
vi∑
j=0
jai(j) = α(vi+1 − vi)−
vi+1∑
j=0
Ai+1(j) +
vi∑
j=0
Ai(j)
≤ α(vi+1 − vi) +
vi∑
j=vi+1+1
Ai(j)
≤ α(vi+1 − vi) +
vi∑
j=vi+1+1
α = 0.
We are now ready to prove a menu complexity lower bound for clean auctions.
Theorem D.15. Consider any clean mechanism M for the FedEx instance described in subsec-
tion D.1 that is 1− 1
1000n2
approximate. For any day i such that n/4 ≤ i < n/2, the mechanism
M satisfies ai(j) ≥ 1300n for all j ∈ [n+ 2, n+ n/4].
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Proof. Consider any day i < n/4 and the pair ai and ai+1 of allocation densities of the mechanism
M on day i and day i+ 1 respectively. Given ai, the optimal revenue that can be generated on
days i+ 1 through n is
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)). The actual revenue generated on
days i+1 through n is at most
∑vmax
j=0 ai+1(j)R≥i+1(j). Thus, allocating according to ai+1 on day
i+1 incurs a revenue loss of at least
∑vmax
j=0 ai(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+i+1))−
∑vmax
j=0 ai+1(j)R≥i+1(j)
on days i+ 1 through n.
Let v∗ be such that Ai(3n+ i) = Ai+1(v∗). We define two allocations bi and bi+115.
bi(v) =

0, v ≤ n+ i
Z1ai(v), n+ i < v ≤ 3n+ i
0, 3n+ i < v,
bi+1(v) =

Z2(ai+1(v)− ai(v)), v ≤ n+ i
Z2ai+1(v), n+ i < v ≤ v∗
0, v∗ < v,
where Z1, Z2 are the normalization constants. Since the mechanism M is clean, we have
ai+1(v) ≥ ai(v) for all v ≤ n+ i by D.1 and therefore bi and bi+1 are valid allocation densities.
Claim D.14. Z1 = Z2 ≤ 3.
Proof. We first prove that Z1 = Z2. This is because
vmax∑
j=0
bi(j)
Z1
= Ai(3n+ i)−Ai(n+ i) = Ai+1(v∗)−Ai(n+ i) =
vmax∑
j=0
bi+1(j)
Z2
.
We now prove that Z1 < 3. Since the mechanism is clean and i < n/4 < n/3, any ‘allocation
mass’ on points [0, n+ i] is pushed forward to all days. Thus, Ai(n+ i) ≤ An/3(4n/3) ≤ 12 by
Lemma D.13. Also, by Lemma D.12, Ai(3n+ i) ≥ 1− 1200n . Thus,
Z1 =
1
Ai(3n+ i)−Ai(n+ i) ≤
1
1/2− 1200n
< 3.
For the remainder of this proof, we set Z denote the common value of Z1 and Z2. We are
now ready to lower bound the loss in revenue caused by allocating according to ai+1. Since
R˜≥i+1 = R≥i+1 for all j ≤ n+ i, we get
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1))−
vmax∑
j=0
ai+1(j)R≥i+1(j)
≥ 1
Z
 3n+i∑
j=n+i+1
bi(j)R˜≥i+1(j)−
v∗∑
j=0
bi+1(j)R≥i+1(j)

=
1
Z
R˜≥i+1
 3n+i∑
j=n+i+1
jbi(j)
− v∗∑
j=0
bi+1(j)R≥i+1(j)
 (R˜≥i+1 is linear in [n+ i+ 1, 3n+ i+ 1])
(17)
We next plan to upper bound
∑v∗
j=0 bi+1(j)R≥i+1(j) using Corollary D.10. To this end,
fix y = max
(
n+ i+ 1,
∑3n+i
j=n+i+1 jbi(j)
)
. Note that n + i + 1 ≤ y ≤ 3n + i. We first show
that y ≥∑3n+ij=0 jbi(j) ≥∑v∗j=0 jbi+1(j). Adding ∑n+ij=0 Zai(v) on both sides, we get that this is
15In this definition we implicitly assume that n + i ≤ v∗. This holds because Ai+1(n + i) ≤ 12 and Ai+1(v∗) =
Ai(3n+ i) ≥ 1− 1200n by Lemma D.12. Since the mechanism is clean and i < n/4 < n/3, any ‘allocation mass’ on
day i+1 on points [0, n+i+1] is pushed forward to all days. Thus, Ai+1(n+i) ≤ Ai+1(n+i+1) ≤ An/3(4n/3) ≤ 12
by Lemma D.13.
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equivalent to showing that
∑3n+i
j=0 Zjai(j) ≥
∑v∗
j=0 Zjai+1(j). This holds due to Lemma D.14.
Now suppose bi+1(n+ i+ 1) <
1
100n . If this is the case, apply Corollary D.10 to the last term in
Equation 17 to get
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1))−
vmax∑
j=0
ai+1(j)R≥i+1(j)
≥ 1
Z
R˜≥i+1
 3n+i∑
j=n+i
jbi(j)
−R≥i+1 (y) + n− i
20(2n+ 1)

≥ 1
3
n− i
20(2n+ 1)
>
1
240
.
where the last inequality is because y ≥∑3n+ij=0 jbi(j) and R˜≥i is increasing below 3n+ i.
Since 1240 >
OPT
1000n2
, this is unaffordable. Thus, bi+1(n+ i+ 1) ≥ 1100n or ai+1(n+ i+ 1) ≥
1
Z100n >
1
300n . Since the mechanism is clean, this is pushed forward to all days implying the
result.
D.5.2 Analyzing general auctions
Theorem D.15 proves an Ω(n2)-menu complexity lower bound for clean auctions. In this
section, we wish to extend this lower bound to general auctions. Our proof will rely heavily
on Corollary D.5 which says that any auction can be viewed as the ‘muddled’ version of a
clean auction. More precisely, the allocation curves Ai of any mechanism are stochastically
dominated by clean curves Bi. We prove that removing a lot of menu options from Bi to get Ai
while maintaining Bi  Ai results in a huge revenue loss day i+ 1 onwards. Since the revenue
generated by Bj for j ≤ i is at least that generated by Aj(4th bullet in Corollary D.5), the huge
loss of revenue on days i+ 1 onwards is tantamount to a huge loss overall.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider an arbitrary mechanism MA and let Ai be the allocation curve
of MA on day i. Corollary D.5 says that there exist allocation curves Bi of a clean mechanism
MB such that Bi  Ai for all i. Let i ∈ (n/4, n/2] be such that the number of menu options on
day i is at most n/8. Let V = {vl}kl=1 be the vector of menu options on day i. Let S be the
polygon approximation of R˜≥i+1 defined by the points in V ∪ [n+ i, vmax]. We have that the
revenue generated by M day i+ 1 onwards is at most
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)) =
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)S(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)).
Since for all i, we have Bi  Ai, and S(min(3n+ i+ 1, x)) is increasing and concave, it holds
by the 3rd bullet in Theorem D.6 that
vmax∑
j=0
ai(j)S(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)) ≤
vmax∑
j=0
bi(j)S(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)).
Consider the mechanism that mimics MB on days 1 through i and does optimally thereafter.
Since it mimics MB on days 1 through i, the revenue generated on these days is at least
that of MA (4
th bullet in Corollary D.5). Day i + 1 onwards, this mechanism generates a
revenue of
∑vmax
j=0 bi(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n + i + 1)). To prove our result it is sufficient to prove
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that
∑vmax
j=0 bi(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1))−
∑vmax
j=0 bi(j)S(min(j, 3n+ i+ 1)) ≥ 160000 ≥ OPT200000n2 .
Observe that since the functions S and R˜≥i+1 are the same for all values at least n+ i, we have
vmax∑
j=0
bi(j)R˜≥i+1(min(j, 3n+i+1))−
vmax∑
j=0
bi(j)S(min(j, 3n+i+1)) =
n+i∑
j=0
bi(j)
(
R˜≥i+1(j)− S(j)
)
.
We know that MB has revenue at least that of MA and is clean. Thus, by Theorem D.15 for
MB, we get that bi has a mass of at least 1/300n on at least n/4 points in the range [n, n+ i].
The function Si in this range is defined by V ∩ [0, n+ i] which has at most n/8 points. Thus,
there are at least n/8 points in the support of bi that are not in V ∩ [0, n + i]. For any such
point x,
S(x) ≤ 1
2
(R≥i+1(x− 1) +R≥i+1(x+ 1))
=
1
2
((n− i)Sx−n−1 + (n− i)Sx−n+1) (Equation 9)
=
n− i
2
(
2Sx−n +
1
λx−n
− 1
λx−n−1
)
= (n− i)Sx−n − n− i
2
λ− 1
λx−n
= R≥i+1(x)− n− 1
8n
1
λx−n
(Equation 9)
≤ R≥i+1(x)− 3(n− i)
32n
<
3
64
. (D.1)
(18)
Thus, the expression
∑n+i
j=0 bi(j)
(
R˜≥i+1(j)− S(j)
)
is at least the same sum over the n/8
points where Equation 18 holds. This sum is thus, at least n8 · 364 · 1300n > 160000 .
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